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Good Governance Practices and Information Disclosure in 
Portuguese Public Enterprise Entity Hospitals 
Abstract 
 
Health rendering entities are fundamental in every country and encompass an important 
share of every state’s economy. The theoretical revolution propitiated by New Public 
Management and Public Governance studies has led governments to act in order to endow 
public owned entities of mechanisms of accountability through mandatory information 
disclosure, among others.  
In Portugal, keeping with international trends, the movement towards better governance 
followed a path of institutional pressure originated in legal provisions stating mandatory 
abidance. Through the last 30 years successive Portuguese governments have implemented 
changes in State-owned entities in general and in public enterprise entity hospitals in 
particular, aiming at pursuing the best practices regarding good governance.  
This study leads us through the evolution in New Public Management and Public 
Governance in order to frame the Portuguese adoption of good governance principles in 
State-owned entities. It lays down the different legislation issued by Portuguese 
governments regarding health rendering services and their governance practices.  
Through multiple case studies, ten hospitals’ annual reports were analysed regarding 
principles of good governance disclosure, in a timeline of six years (2006-2011), it aims at 
understanding the drivers of change in information disclosure behaviours in the National 
Health Services under the light of institutional theory combined with Oliver’s model 
(1991) of strategic responses to institutional pressures. 
The study demonstrates that the adoption of the disclosure requirements was progressive 
and that most of the entities seem to have adopted an avoidance strategy, pretending 
compliance with the legal requirements in the light of Oliver’s model instead of a full 
compliance. The strategic response adopted allows concluding that entities appear to be 
more concerned with apparently fulfilling legal demands than with actually meeting them 
in what can be described as a ceremonial compliance. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Public enterprise entities, Hospitals, Information 
disclosure. 
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Práticas de Bom Governo e Divulgação de Informação por parte dos 
Hospitais Públicos de Gestão Privada Portugueses 
Resumo 
 
Os Hospitais, sendo entidades prestadoras de cuidados de saúde, são fundamentais em 
todos os países e representam um setor fundamental do Estado. A revolução teórica 
propiciada pela New Public Management e pela Public Governance conduziram a que os 
governos agissem de forma a dotar as empresas detidas pelo Estado de mecanismos de 
accountability através, nomeadamente, da publicação de legislação sobre divulgação de 
boas práticas de governo das sociedades. Em Portugal, em consonância com a tendência 
internacional, o movimento de implementação de boas práticas de governo das sociedades 
seguiu um caminho de pressão institucional com origem em legislação de cumprimento 
obrigatório. Nos últimos trinta anos, os sucessivos governos portugueses implementaram 
mudanças nas entidades detidas pelo Estado, em geral, e nos hospitais entidades públicas 
empresariais, em particular, com o objetivo de estimular as melhores práticas de governo 
das entidades.  
Este estudo apresenta a evolução da New Public Management e da Public Governance com 
o objetivo de enquadrar a adoção em Portugal de princípios de bom governo nas entidades 
detidas pelo Estado, especialmente nas entidades prestadoras de cuidados de saúde. É 
apresentada a evolução em termos normativos do Serviço Nacional de Saúde e suas 
práticas de bom governo. Com recursos a estudos de caso múltiplos, são analisados os 
relatórios e contas anuais de 10 hospitais entidade públicas empresariais, com o objetivo de 
averiguar de que forma evoluiu a divulgação das práticas de bom governo ao longo de seis 
anos (2006-2011). Esta análise é efetuada à luz da teoria institucional combinada com o 
modelo de Oliver (1991) de respostas estratégicas a pressões institucionais. 
O estudo permite concluir que a adoção dos requisitos de divulgação foi progressiva e que 
a maioria dos hospitais terá adotado uma estratégia de ilusão, aparentando o cumprimento 
com as disposições legais, à luz do modelo de Oliver, em lugar de uma completa adoção 
dos requisitos legais. A estratégia adotada permite concluir que as entidades parecem estar 
mais preocupadas em aparentar o cumprimento da lei do que no seu efetivo respeito, o que 
pode ser visto como uma adoção cerimonial das disposições legais em vigor. 
Palavras-chave: Governo das sociedades, Entidades públicas empresariais, Hospitais, 
Divulgação de informação. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation and Scenario for Research 
State-owned Entities (SOEs) represent a fundamental part of the state’s economic 
activity and have been harshly criticized regarding performance indicators and 
management practices.  These critics have been even more accentuated when referring to 
Public Enterprise Entity Hospitals (PEEHs) integrating the Portuguese National Health 
Service (NHS) (Barros & Simões, 2007). For this reason it is fundamental that SOEs, 
particularly PEEHs, adopt governance models that allow an adequate management able to 
fulfil the desired objectives. As such, it is essential to create adequate information 
disclosure mechanisms (among others). This information disclosure will allow government 
structures and entities’ performance to be object of greater attention from the stakeholders 
in general (Guthrie & English, 1997). 
Recent efforts made by government towards the adoption of good governance 
practices in public administration have reinforced the high quality information disclosure 
necessity so that management’s behaviour can be better perceived. These efforts have also 
been reflected in PEEHs’ governance practices (Barros & Simões, 2007). During the last 
decade several changes were introduced within the legal framework of Portuguese SOEs in 
what concerns good governance practices, such as Ministries’ Council Resolution (MCR) 
No. 49/2007, 28 March, and public manager’s new regime (Decree-law No. 71/2007, 27 
March). This process has followed international movements to increase good governance 
practices in public entities of which are examples the Cadbury Report (issued in 1992), the  
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (issued in 1999) and the OECD Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance of State-owned enterprises. 
Given the difficult financial period that Portugal is facing and the need to inculcate 
transparency, responsibility and accountability by public entities, it is important to analyse 
how the changes of the legal framework, concerning good practices, have influenced the 
disclosure of these subjects by hospitals, in particular PEEHs. As such, the study on how 
emanated laws regarding good governance in Portugal have reflected on PEEHs’ 
governance practices is imbedded with relevance and actuality, given their importance and 
proximity to the population. 
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1.2. Objectives and Research Questions 
The main objective of this research is to analyse in which way state regulations on 
good governance in Portugal have determined PEEHs behaviour namely regarding 
information disclosure. Consequently, it intends to answer the following question: How did 
Portuguese legislation efforts on good governance principles influence the information 
disclosure in PEEHs?  
Due to the complexity of this departure question it can be divided in the following 
three sub questions:  
• What is the legal framework of good governance principles applicable to external 
reporting in PEEHs? 
• Which are the consequences of this legal framework in the external reporting of the 
PEEHs? 
• In which way did the PEEHs institutionalize this legal framework in their financial 
reporting mechanisms? 
 
1.3. Research Method 
Given the objective of this study and the main research questions, an exploratory, 
interpretive study will be conducted where the information disclosure of 10 PEEHs will be 
analysed during the period from 2006 to 2011. These hospitals were chosen by a size 
criterion that is, the five hospitals with higher revenue and the five hospitals with the 
lowest revenue in 2011. The information was obtained through the analysis of the financial 
statements of the hospitals comprising the PEEHs universe in Portugal and their relative 
weight in the PEEHs consolidated financial statements of 2011 and a content analysis 
developed and interpreted through the lenses of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991), and particularly, the strategic responses to institutional pressures as developed by 
Oliver (1991). The period of analysis was chosen given the fact that the legal provision on 
which the study is based upon (MCR No. 49/2007, 28 March) was published in 2007 and 
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ends in 2011, since the accounts for 2012 of the selected hospitals were not available when 
the data were collected for the research.   
 
1.4. Expected Contributions 
This research aims to contribute to the increase of knowledge regarding public 
enterprise entities’ governance disclosure practices in health services. Also, it intends to 
increase the literature on hospital governance practices and to open perspectives for further 
research in this field. 
By bringing together the several legal dispositions that frame the NHS in Portugal, 
regarding governance, this study may be useful for a better understanding of the state of 
the art in hospital governance nowadays. 
Additionally, it is expected to enhance the knowledge of regulation bodies on the 
needs for future legislation on public sector governance issues.  
 
1.5. Structure of the Study 
This study is divided in six chapters. The first chapter lays down the pertinence of 
the issues regarding PEEHs’ information disclosures, the research questions, the objectives 
of the research, its importance, contributions and structure. 
The second chapter begins with a brief history of New Public Management (NPM) 
and its reforms and proceeds to develop a literature review on NPM issues and on previous 
studies regarding corporate governance in public services especially in public hospitals. 
This literature review aims at focusing the problematic of information disclosure regarding 
good governance practices to support the development of this study. 
Chapter three is dedicated to the research methodology used to perform this study. 
In it institutional theory is outlined as a mean to explain PEEHs’ behaviour regarding the 
adoption of good governance practices with a special emphasis in the mimic strategy of 
“doing what others do”, adapting Oliver’s model (1991). It will also be laid down the data 
collection chosen to analyse PEEHs’ adoption of good governance principles.   
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In chapter four, is set out the characterization of the Portuguese NHS, as well as its 
legal framework and evolution.  
Chapter five is dedicated to the empirical study. In it is made a brief history of the 
entities chosen for analysis. Also, an analysis of the entities disclosures and their evolution 
is laid out and related to the legal provision chosen to be studied. Last, is presented a 
discussion and analysis of the results. 
Finally, chapter six presents the study’s conclusion, its contributions, limitations 
and possible leads for further researches in this field. 
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2. Literature Review 
The present chapter is organized in two sections. The first section comprises the 
literature review on NPM and Corporate Governance, namely, NPM and governance 
principles, Public Enterprise Entities in NHS and governance practices, and a summary of 
previous studies regarding Hospital Corporate Governance.  The second section provides a 
review of studies regarding the pressures in organization changing pressures, in particular a 
review of institutional theory and of strategic responses to institutional pressures is 
provided. 
 
2.1. New Public Management and Public Governance 
In order to understand the connection between the NPM and Public Governance it 
is important to make clear how NPM has influenced governance principles.  
 
2.1.1. New Public Management and Governance Principles  
According to Hill and Lynn (2009), public management is the process of ensuring 
that the achievement of lawful public policy goals is assured by the correct allocation and 
use of resources. This broad definition allows perceiving the multi dimensions that the 
concept enfolds. 
For the greater part of the 20th century, public management and public 
administration were mixed concepts and only in the 70’s, with the changes in how 
government was managing its responsibilities (Heinrich, 2011) did it become evident that 
there was a realignment of the management practices, from a more hierarchical an legal 
trend to a more professional and performance directed management. 
Since the 70’s, a new term came into fashion, governance. This term has been used 
in the last decades as a more inclusive concept enfolding both public administration and 
public management. According to Heinrich (2011), governance is the exercise of authority, 
public or private regarding collective action and comprises formal and informal 
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relationships between economic agents in a way that widens public management trends 
aiming at decentralization and emphasising accountability.     
During the second half of the 20th century, changes took place both in public 
institutions and in public management theory, that clearly made the existent corporate 
governance unadjusted (Lane, 2000). NPM arose from these changes and had its origins in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (firstly in the United Kingdom and the United States and, 
progressively, by Australia and New Zealand) having been later adopted by other countries 
(Groot & Budding, 2008).  
NPM comes into being as a discussion over the state’s necessity to leave some 
activities to private initiative or, at least, create new management models based upon 
private management (contracting) and was influenced by several theories, such as public 
choice theory and agency theory, among others, and is turned to rational management and 
economic efficiency increase (Gomes, Oliveira, Costa & Soares, 2011; Gruening, 2001; 
Groot & Budding, 2008). NPM reforms have been implemented in diverse ways in 
different countries. While Anglo Saxon countries provided fertile ground for NPM (by 
their parliamentary systems’ features), Scandinavian countries, with more complex 
parliament conditions, not rarely with coalition governments, were more reluctant in 
implementing the reforms (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007).   
The dawning of NPM reforms had its roots in several factors ranging from 
economic to social. Common features to the countries implementing NPM reforms were 
economic and fiscal crisis which enhanced the urgency to cut down costs in public services 
rendered and contributed to the discussion of the role of the state which was increased by 
the welfare state crisis (Larbi, 1999). The rise of Neoliberalism ideas in the 1970s, the 
information technology evolution and the use of international consultants are usually 
pointed out as other causes for the NPM reforms. In developing countries, lending 
constraints and the increasing weight of good governance has also been stressed out as key 
factors for NPM reforms. 
The reforms in NPM shifted the emphasis from public administration to public 
management (Lane, 1994). As such, one of the main features of NPM reforms has been the 
adoption by the public administration, from education to health, of organization and 
governance models typical of the private sector (Clatworthy, Mellet & Peel, 2000), 
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namely,  regarding management models, entrepreneurial spirit and accountability impact in 
administrative procedures, which compels to the adoption of high transparency standards 
(Lapsley, 2008). 
These reforms have led to a revolutionary change both in the manner of delivering 
social services and accounting for government expenditures and in the structures of 
governance (Tolofari, 2005). They aimed at the application of business management 
theories and practices, characteristic of capitalist models, in public service administration, 
such as, rationalization, efficiency, accountability, transparency and output orientation 
(Correia, 2011). NPM is often mentioned together with ‘governance’, in which 
“governance is about the overarching structure of government and the setting up of overall 
strategy, while NPM is the operational aspect of the new type of public administration” 
(Tolofari, 2005, p. 75).  
NPM provides a diverse set of choices rather than a single option, which have been 
summarized by many authors (Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt, 1993; Dunleavy & Hood, 1994), 
comprising, as stated by Manning (2001, p. 299): 
…a management culture and orientation that emphasize the centrality of the citizen or customer, and 
accountability for results. Then there are some structural or organizational choices that reflect 
decentralized authority and control, with a wide variety of alternative service delivery mechanisms 
including quasi-markets with newly separated service providers for resourcing from the policy 
makers and funders. The market orientation is further shown in the emphasis on cost recovery and in 
the competition between public and private agencies for the contract to deliver services.  
According to Tolofari (2005, p. 83), as main characteristics of NPM, we can 
highlight: large-scale privatisation, corporatisation and commercialisation; processes of 
managerialism and marketization; a shift from maintenance management to change 
management; parsimony: cutting costs and applying only the least necessary amount of 
resources with the aim of achieving the maximum utility possible; a shift from input 
controls to output and outcome controls; the creation of quasi-markets and greater 
competition; devolution/decentralisation; disaggregation and tighter performance 
specification. 
NPM in healthcare services features are lined up with NPM main characteristics 
since they have implied, as highlighted by Simonet (2008), greater reliance on market 
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forces, a stronger demand for organizational performance, fostering greater accountability 
and transparency from providers, increasing patient financial responsibility, looking for 
savings, increased concerns about services quality, using contracting-out, a 
decentralization of decision and greater citizen participation (Simonet 2008). 
Notwithstanding the success of NPM, many governments still have several 
elements of traditional public management which makes it too soon to conclude on the 
unsustainability of the traditional public management (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007).  
There is little doubt that NPM has been in the centre of attentions both in scholarly 
and in practice ways. And it is commonly accepted that it contributed to increased 
accountability and responsibility in government services in an enterprise like manner 
(Hatry, 2010). Albeit this goodness, there are three major weaknesses pointed out at NPM, 
which are: the inexistence of a common denominator (like return on assets or profit) as in 
private owned companies; the existence of several structures of authority in the public 
sector (that difficult the setting out of a linkage between objectives and performance 
measure indicators); and the political nature of NPM that uses administrative measures to 
solve political problems (Bao, Wang, Larsen & Morgan, 2013). 
These criticisms have led to a countermovement both in academic and practice 
commonly called New Public Governance (NPG), which has brought the political values to 
centre stage. This term was first used in academic works in 1998 (Toonen, 1998) and is 
generally used to describe new governing structures and processes used by government to 
promote the common good (Larsen, 2008; Osborne, 2010). As such, NPG has emerged 
from NPM as a distinctive set on its own and has three main features which were 
undervalued by NPM. These features comprise: value centred NPG (increasing the state’s 
goals to the promotion of common good); the importance of government processes that 
facilitate implementable measures; and the creation of public good as a common process 
where public, private and non-profit sectors cooperate (Bao et al., 2013). These features 
are underlined by the fact that government performance is measured in a political context 
where those three activity sectors work towards the same ending.  
After the first two decades of NPM reforms, we assist nowadays to a post reformist 
movement (post NPM) that defines itself not by the replacement of NPM reforms but by 
their revision and complement (Pollit, 2003; see also Lapsley, 2008). 
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Since the late 1980s, good governance has been in the centre of discussion for NPM 
reforms since accountability and costumer concerns have been considered as good 
governance features by international organisations. For some authors, governance is the 
New Public Management (Frederickson, 2005) and, in this way we can relate the two 
concepts and perceive the attention paid by international organizations to good governance.  
In 1992, the World Bank considered necessary for good governance several 
elements, such as can be detailed as follows: 
• Effective financial and human resource management by severing inefficiency 
(mainly in SOE) through better budgeting, accounting and reporting; 
• Attempting to make public sector officials accountable for their performance 
and, more consumer-sensitive. This implies the increase of accountability in 
public institutions, as well as, improved accounting, auditing and 
decentralization; 
• A well-functioning juridical, legal framework that enables the economic agents 
to take accordingly rational decisions; 
• A developed and transparent information system, that may reduce the risk of 
corruption by enhancing public discussion and analysis; and 
• Organizational reforms aim at improving public hospitals governance changing 
and bettering objectives, supervision and environment related mechanisms. 
(Raposo, 2007).  
Regarding public sector governance, it can be said that traditional governance lies 
in the fact that the State takes up several roles in providing goods and services to the 
population. Modern corporate governance sets apart these roles and the State does not 
operate directly in governance but through agents that manage public sector in its name 
(Lane, 2000). 
According to Lane (2000), in modern corporate governance of SOEs, State and 
managers operate on demand’s side having as opponents several suppliers that procure 
government contracts.  Modern governance allows these suppliers to be equally treated, 
that is, those who present the lowest prices should be the selected ones, ceteris paribus. 
Thus, NPM lies in the agency theory in which the State is the principal and public 
managers are its agents. 
12 
 
The traditional public company structure is disappearing due both to deregulation 
and globalization. Financial scandals, the relation between corporate governance and 
economic development, and the way in which it affects both growth and development 
(Claessens, 2003) have contributed to a sustained movement of recommendations’ issue 
and good governance practices. This movement was based upon the idea that voluntary 
rules are preferable to legal mandatory dispositions regarding market trust recovery (Silva, 
Vitorino, Alves, Cunha & Monteiro, 2006). 
Even though these good governance codes were directed primarily to public entities 
their promoters considered the extension of their adoption by all the companies, State-
owned included as desirable. Globally, the legislation effort was significantly influenced 
by world reference texts. 
Besides the Cadbury Report (Cadbury Committee, 1992), pioneer of this code 
movement there were also the “Principles of Corporate Governance” issued by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), initially in 1999 and 
updated in 2004 (OECD, 1999, 2004). OECD has recently enlarged these principles to the 
State’s role as shareholder and to SOE, issuing recommendations in order to organize and 
disclose good governance practices (OECD, 2005). 
The main question at public sector governance level regards in how the public 
manager’s sense of duty leads him to defend States’ interests (Bertelli, 2012). By this it is 
understandable the adoption of private companies’ good governance principles in SOEs. 
 
2.1.2. Public Enterprise Entities in NHS and Governance Practices 
Hospitals are extremely complex organizations (Glouberman & Mintzberg, 2001a, 
2001b), representing the most complex human organization ever attempted to be managed 
(Drucker, 1989). Of the several kinds of existent organizations, hospitals represent the 
most intensive resources consuming – human, capital, technological – entity, needing for 
that of a management framework encompassing a professional team of managers.  At the 
same time it plays a fundamental role in society by rendering healthcare services. 
Hospitals are organizations with unique features (specific form of ownership, lack 
of the principle of profit maximization, replacement of shareholders by an expanded 
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diversity of stakeholders, less transparency and greater difficulty in evaluating the results 
of their transactions, and the locus of the decision-making process itself is much more 
diffuse) not allowing the direct adoption of the principles and codes of good corporate 
governance without specific adjustments (Raposo, 2007). 
One of the definitions for corporate governance considers that this terminology 
describes all the influences affecting institutional processes, including those related to 
controllers/regulator designation, involved in production and goods/services sales 
organization (Turnbull, 1997). Similarly, we may consider that hospital governance can be 
defined as the group of structures and processes which define the hospital’s strategic 
orientation (mission, vision, values, objectives) and the forms in which resources (human, 
technological, political and financial) are organized and allocated in order to meet the 
strategic guidelines (Rice, 2003). 
In several articles regarding hospital governance in Canada, governance arises as a 
board of directors’ exercise of authority, management and control over the hospital 
(Hundert & Crawford, 2002a, 2002b; Hundert, 2003; Hundert & Topp, 2003). These 
authors believe that the fundamental responsibilities of governance are: (1) to define the 
objectives and the principles which will guide the hospital; (2) to insure and monitor 
hospital services’ quality; (3) to assure tax compliance and the hospital’s continuity and (4) 
to organize and prepare the means to supervise the hospital’s management effectiveness. 
When health care services are at stake, governance cannot be viewed without 
considering social responsibility and ethical factors. The provision of health care services 
must be associated with a corporate social responsibility that implies a common benefit, 
such as providing high quality services to everyone entitled to it (Brandão, Rego, Duarte & 
Nunes, 2012). This means the adoption of determined behaviour by management, which 
can mean simple law conformity or taking a step towards a more active action and 
adopting also moral behaviours, such as environment protection and reverse discrimination 
policies. The accomplishment of corporate social responsibility is dependent of the 
governance model adopted. Law may enhance new governance models but, in itself, is 
insufficient to assure social responsibility. Legal provisions only indicate the route to be 
followed, but there are many aspects that supersede them, such as promoting costumers 
satisfaction and community actions (Brandão et al., 2012). 
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Hospitals, more than economic concerns, have social goals that comprise, among 
others, the delivery of high quality health services, promotion of social equity and a safer 
environment. Corporate governance supplies the framing for both the economic and social 
dimensions of these entities. Traditionally unsustainable in an economic sense, hospitals 
have gone under NPM reforms in an attempt made by governments to save the welfare 
State. The corporatisation of hospitals intended to embody private practices, considered 
more efficient. Among these practices appears social responsibility, so it can be assumed 
that, by adopting private practices, hospitals also adopt social responsibility obligations. 
In this context, hospital governance can be divided in three perspectives: corporate 
governance, clinical governance and non-clinical supporting elements (Brandão et al., 
2012), being corporate governance the basis for the other two. In order to accomplish 
performance and social responsibility objectives, modern hospitals usually develop internal 
and external control systems organized to ensure the accomplishment of those objectives. 
Good governance implies the existence of several instruments such as performance 
indicators, ethics codes and acquisitions’ procedures that to ensure accountability should 
be fully disclosed. As such, good governance may be seen as an instrument to prevent bad 
management practices and unethical behaviour.  
In Portugal, the corporatization of public hospitals began in 20021, when 31 
hospitals belonging to the public administration were transformed into public companies as 
a result of a new regime for hospital management’ approval. The objective was to reform 
hospital management, modernizing management features, maintaining, however, the social 
responsibility of the State. 
In 2005, this process moved forward with the adoption of a new designation for 
these hospitals, PEEHs2, withdrawing the intention of privatization from the political 
agenda. This measure was based upon the premise that the legal form of PEEH is best 
suited to the pursuit of a better level of institutions’ functioning. 
Portuguese hospital’s corporatization was contextualized in a wave of reforms that 
had taken place in other countries previously within the NPM reforms and lied down in the 
implementation of an hospital management reform, maintaining, however the States’ 
                                                 
1
 Law No. 27/2002, 8 November. 
2
 Decree-law No. 233/2005. 
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responsibility in health services’ rendering (Gomes et al., 2011). Furthermore, the adoption 
of good governance principles by Public Enterprise Entities (PEEs) reflects the late issue 
of good governance codes which was only initiated in 2007 even though the private sector 
had already some tradition, namely through the recommendations of Comissão do 
Mercado dos Valores Mobiliários [Portuguese Securities and Exchange Commission] 
(CMVM).  
With the corporatization, what changed were essentially the ownership structure, 
the contract policy’s flexibility and human resources recruitment, as well as the 
development in information technologies. Deep inside most of the PEEHs kept their 
organization scheme unaltered both regarding governance models and internal structure 
(OPSS, 2006). In this context, hospitals corporatization has allowed the implementation of 
control and supervision mechanisms that may create the basis for effective hospital 
governance and for hospitals’ development, chiefly by creating higher levels of 
transparency and accountability. 
Change in governance models aims at bettering the responsibility and quality of 
financial reporting as well as the transparency and efficiency of the management boards. 
Most of the evidence has its roots in the private sector, based upon the Anglo Saxon 
governance system and focus mainly on indicators for management board’s performance, 
which can be isolated in three main aspects: power structure; composition; and scope of 
action (Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996).  The question to be 
answered, bearing in mind that the analysis is made in an entrepreneurial perspective, is 
how to consider its implications in healthcare services. 
Corporatization and good governance codes are two realities that walk side by side. 
Corporatization introduces new models of governance in public institutions allowing 
passing from a substantially administrative and bureaucratic model to an “enterprise” 
model which adopts private sector management methods. The adoption of good 
governance principles focuses on the assumption of ethical postures and behaviours, 
fundamental to a management lined with the effective interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders in general. The adoption of good governance principles in PEEs is inserted in 
the movement of corporate governance and the issue of good governance codes. 
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In Portugal, in 1999 and later in 2001, 2003 and 2005, CMVM issued several 
recommendations regarding corporate governance addressed to public companies (CMVM, 
2005). These recommendations aimed at contributing to the optimization of companies’ 
performance favouring stakeholders. In 2007, according to this attempt of efficiency 
increase, and admitting to some extent insufficiency of thought as to the role of the State 
while shareholder, the Portuguese government issued the new public Manager’s Regime 
(Decree-law No.71/2007, 27 March), the Principles of Good Governance for PEEs 
(Ministries’ Council Resolution (MCR) No.49/2007, 28 March) and altered the legal 
regime of PEEs and SOEs in order to reflect governance issues (Decree-law No. 300/2007, 
23 August). 
Corporatization and the adoption of good governance practices (namely, the 
publication of the new public manager’s regime), the publication of the PEEs good 
governance principles, the change in the PEEs and SOEs’ regime and the establishment of 
an evaluation committee for PEEHs aim at promoting hospital governance and public 
hospital with good governance principles. The new public manager’s regime intended to 
implement a modern regime that enfolds every SOE, regardless of its legal form and to 
clearly define the notion of public manager, the way management should be exercised and 
the rules by which it should abide, and to regulate the nomination, performance and 
resignation of public managers. 
This statute brings together the public manager to the private manager, giving 
enhanced relevance and development to the incompatibilities’ regime, performance 
evaluation, remuneration’s policy, social benefits and ethical rules and international 
corporate governance practices, as well as transparency.  
As stated, good governance principles in PEEs arise from the admittance by the 
State, as stated in MCR No. 49/2007, 28 March, that, regarding the State’s role as 
shareholder, there are few guidelines in governance practices disclosures. As such, from 
this diploma stand out both principles committed to the State in itself as well as principles 
committed to PEEs, regarding: (1) mission, objectives and general performance principles; 
(2) board and supervising bodies’ structures; (3) remunerations and other benefits; (4) 
conflict of interests’ prevention; and (5) relevant information disclosure. This last 
determines that all the information related with goof governance principles should be 
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disclosed through an internet site (“sítio das empresas do Estado”), to be created by the 
General Directorate of Treasury and Finance (Direção Geral do Tesouro e das Finanças). 
These measures intended to encourage PEEs to have governance models that allow 
them to obtain high performance levels and, along with the good examples given by 
private initiative companies, contribute to the spreading of good governance practices. 
In May 2011, with the signature of the Financial and Economic Assistance Program 
between Portugal, the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, arose an additional demand regarding PEEs obligations which must take 
place through the reinforcement of the Governance model (Princípios de Bom Governo, 
2012). The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), then signed, establishes the creation of 
a PEEs governance model in conformity with the best international practices, including the 
evaluation of shareholder’s duties embodying the Finance Ministry of a decisive role 
regarding the financial matters of PEEs, thus contributing to the reinforcement of the 
supervision of Public Administration over PEEs. 
In this view the MCR No. 49/2007, 28 March, is vested of significant relevance 
once it has defined good governance principles directed both to the State and the PEEs. 
There is a special focus on transparency, risk control and conflict of interests’ prevention 
promoting efficiency in governance. At this level, PEEs face several challenges, among 
which the severity in management, and, to address this, the Portuguese government carried 
out, in 2012, the reform of the legal regime of PEEs, with reflexions on governance 
models, increased transparency, information’s disclosure and increased demands on 
objectives’ compliance. 
The changes have been considerable in the last decades stimulating the 
development of research on the topic. 
 
2.1.3. Previous Studies Regarding Hospital Corporate Governance 
In this section, a brief review of previous studies concerned with public sector 
governance, namely in healthcare services, will be presented. 
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As previously mentioned, most of the evidence regarding public sector governance 
studies has its roots in Anglo Saxon studies. Hence, in 1995, Ferlie, Ashburner and 
Fitzgerald, in an article on governance in the British NHS (Ferlie, et al., 1995), have 
analysed the impact of reforms made by the government in the beginning of the 90’s on 
governance in the public sector. In this study, which did not focus in governance’s 
financial aspects, mail inquiries were made to several NHS institutions as well as corporate 
documents analysis and interviews to regional and district healthcare institutions 
representatives. The authors have concluded that NHS reorganization, conducted through 
government reforms in the 90’s, has led to a management’s efficiency increase, measured 
by increased level of meeting attendance and board downsizing, as well as higher qualified 
non-executive board members. On the other hand, the authors have identified some 
fragilities in the fact that there were no “downwards accountability” mechanisms but only 
upward accountability informal mechanisms by the fact that board members fear not to be 
reappointed in their mandates. 
Clatworthy, Mellet and Peel (2000) have made a comparison between corporate 
governance mechanisms in private held companies and British NHS institutions in 2000. 
The adoption of an enterprise model of corporate governance by NHS, with similar 
obligations such as financial reporting in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, that includes a balance sheet, a profit and loss statement and a cash flow 
statement, duly audited, allows the comparison between these two different realities 
(public versus private). NHS entities are managed by boards that are evaluated on a service 
performance basis. As such, NHS is an example of management in light of NPM reforms 
and, in this context, allows the comparison with private held companies. Regarding 
financial information disclosure, NHS has adopted the existing rules in the private sector 
(with the difference of profit and loss statement, where the NHS institutions prepare a 
statement based upon expense and income instead of profit and loss), extending this 
adoption to a management’s report (Clatworthy et al., 2000). Notwithstanding, whereas in 
private held companies managers are supposed to maximize the shareholders return, in 
NHS there are no results’ based objectives existing only break even (between income and 
expense) goals, return on assets levels and respect for an agreed upon level of expense. The 
level of compliance with these objectives must be disclosed in annual reports and, in case 
of noncompliance, a detailed review of the organizations performance is made. 
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These authors have concluded that conceptual differences between private and 
public sectors difficult the adoption of a sole governance model by both. This can be better 
perceived in the NHS, because healthcare services have a duty towards their clients 
(population in general) that does not exist in private sector. 
Regarding governance in hospitals in New Zealand, Barnett, Perkins and Powell 
(2001) have analysed the health system reform in that country.  In 1990, the New 
Zealander government carried out a restructuration of hospitals that, with a high 
managerialist trend, reformed health service providing entities. As a result, hospitals 
became more enterprise alike with a sole shareholder (the State). The shareholders’ 
interests were defended by a counselling unit that focused its analysis on financial 
indicators.  
These authors have supported their study in stakeholder theory because it allows the 
incorporation of several points of view (Barnett et al., 2001) and by the fact that there are 
several stakeholders interested in hospital governance. The authors then selected the 
stakeholders related with corporative interests (State, counselling unit, boards and chief 
financial executives) and financial analysis indicators (such as return on equity and return 
on assets) and nonfinancial indicators (such as staff turnover, management’s board 
composition, and inpatient occupancy rate). Following this selection the authors performed 
an analysis on the counselling unit’s reports, conducted a mail enquiry to management 
board’ presidents and interviewed 20 members of the hospital boards and of the 
counselling unit.  
As a result of the study, the authors have concluded that the governance model was 
only entrepreneurial in form and not in substance, since the results have allowed showing 
that the health system was underfunded and expectations had been put at the financial 
performance level instead of the social responsibility level. 
Ryan and Ng (2000) have analysed the financial reporting of public state entities in 
Queensland, Australia. To these authors, the inexistence of a corporate governance 
framework leads to fragmented financial reporting (Ryan & Ng, 2000). This paper 
conducts a literature review at corporate governance level and provides an analysis of the 
information disclosure in a sample of public sector entities’ reports. The analysis of 
disclosure practices allows verifying their agreement with the governance principles. From 
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the reports of the 20 entities selected the authors only analysed the corporate governance 
related chapters. These chapters have been analysed through a content analysis of 
corporate oral and written communication (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998). The authors have 
identified five disclosure elements at the corporate governance level (leadership, 
management environment, risk management, monitoring and accountability). Of these five 
items the most recurrent was monitoring, while the less frequent was accountability. Even 
though this study has several limitations, as the fact that corporate governance disclosure is 
many times spread in different sections of the management report, and only corporate 
governance related chapters have been analysed, it has allowed to conclude that it is 
necessary a general framework for public sector corporate governance disclosures that 
enables a structured information disclosure (Ryan & Ng, 2000). 
In a study on hospital governance in Norway, Pettersen, Nyland, and Kaarboe 
(2012) analyse the introduction of new governance models in hospitals questioning the 
impact of these new models in hospital boards. The authors use normative views on 
hospital boards framed by agency theory (according to the authors, the international 
reforms on NHS institutions can be placed within the principal/agent logic since they 
aimed at protecting the State’s interests in order to increase efficiency) and stakeholder’s 
theory (Pettersen et al., 2012). This both qualitative and quantitative research was done 
through exploratory interviews to Hospital boards’ members, legal documents’ analysis 
and follow-up interviews with key decision makers (Pettersen et al., 2012).  
The NHS reforms in Norway occurred in the 1970s and begun by transferring 
hospital ownership to county council as a decentralization measure. The State maintained 
its interests by controlling the county councils’ legal provisions. In the 1990s, increasing 
deficits and waiting lists led government to recentralize hospitals and, in 2001, they were 
organized into self-governing state enterprises (Pettersen et al., 2012) under a NPM wave. 
The hospitals supervisory bodies’ functions were the basis for an effective management 
and as such they had to be carefully designated. Board’s composition followed the criteria 
established in the Hospital Enterprise Act (a 2001 government disposition), which 
determined that the board’s role was to zeal for the shareholder’s interests (the State) and 
to be its instrument in satisfying the needs of the population. As such its members should 
not be politicians but professionals. Following a political shift, in 2006, the government 
decided that 50% of hospital board composition should be constituted by politicians.  
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In recent years, Norwegian government has produced several legal provisions 
which leave little space for board’s decision making, shifting their roles to a stakeholder’s 
perspective therefore enhancing the State’s role.  
The interviews conducted on board members were divided by respondents in: 
politicians, staff representatives and professionals outside the medical sector (Pettersen et 
al., 2012). Their perceptions over the board’s scope of action were different, which seems 
to confirm a stakeholders approach. In fact, most of the respondents consider that the 
boards have narrow space of decision. The authors conclude that there is a trade-off 
between the implementation of policies by government and the scope of action of the 
boards (Pettersen et al., 2012). This resulted of a shift from a principal/agent approach to a 
stakeholders approach in sequence of a change in boards’ composition (when 50% of the 
boards’ members became politicians) (Pettersen et al., 2012). As such, a question arises 
which is in what way hospital governance may affect performance. 
In a study on governance in primary healthcare services in Australia, King and 
Green (2012) analysed the design of governance systems through general practitioners 
behaviour in Australian primary healthcare practices (King & Green, 2012). In Australia, 
primary healthcare practices are mainly committed to private initiative either being owned 
by doctors or companies and, even though historically management was made by owners, 
in recent years there has been a trend towards delegation in professional practice managers 
(King & Green, 2012). Australian government has also entered this market by establishing 
“GP super clinics”3 (as they were designated by the Australian government) from 2008 
onwards. 
The study was conducted upon a combination of interviews and publicly available 
practice information regarding seven practices across several states in Australia, with the 
objective of investigating the practices’ governance structures and the manager’s 
perceptions of these practices. This study found that governance structures’ complexity is 
directly related with size and ownership spread (the greater the size, the more complex 
governance). However, this also revealed that more complex governance structures were 
synonym of higher performance, while small practices with concentred ownership tend to 
disregard bureaucracy and rules (King & Green, 2012). 
                                                 
3
 General practice super clinics are comprehensive primary healthcare centres which offer extended hours 
and team-based care (King & Green, 2001).  
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All these changes in hospitals and their governance structures may be analysed 
under the light of the pressures exerted over the sector by external forces.  
 
2.2. Pressures in Organization Changing Processes 
In this section is provided a literature review of institutional theory and of strategic 
responses to institutional pressures. 
 
2.2.1. Institutional Theory 
Until the 70’s in the 20th century, organisational studies were based upon internal 
operations and, only from that period onwards, did authors begin to study the relation 
between organizations and external environment (Santos, 2009). Institutional authors focus 
on the influence of institutional factors as rules, values, traditions, power and internal and 
external pressures in organization changing processes (Scott, 1995). Among other issues, 
institutional sociology literature worries with mimic and the reasons why changes in 
organizations produce isomorphic organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Abernethy & 
Chua, 1996; Ter Bogt, 2008). 
Even though it has several definitions in different areas in sociology and 
organisational theory, institutionalism encompasses a rejection of agent’s rationality based 
models by opposition to a concern with the institutions as independent variables and to a 
shift to cultural and cognitive explanations (Gomes, 2007). As such, one of the main 
contributions of institutional theory was supplying explanations that do not reflect agent’s 
rationality focusing on the nature and practices of the institutions (Gomes, 2007).  
Organizations are the result of exerted pressures, both internal and externally by 
environment, and some authors (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 & 1991) defend that any 
organizations can survive if it does not adjust to surrounding practices, traditions and 
systems (Major & Ribeiro, 2009). 
Policies work as powerful myths and many organizations conform to them as 
ceremony (ritual) (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and not as conscientious acceptance of their 
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need. Many of organizations’ behaviours are determined by law, social prestige and public 
opinion among others. These formal structure elements work as legitimated myths of 
mandatory compliance regardless of real needs and organization features.  
As such, organization structures are created and made more complex with the 
increase of institutionalized myths that they have to support. This can lead to an 
estrangement between the organization’s activity, its practices and the need to comply with 
these myths. 
One of the arguments favouring this approach is the notion that the more 
institutionalized is the environment and organizations, the higher efforts will be made by 
management to keep a certain public image and status sacrificing effective management 
practices. In other words, there is more effort regarding ceremony level (looking like) than 
at effective level (being) (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), that can be applied to the analysis of 
disclosures regarding corporate governance. 
As stated above, in institutional theory we can almost apply the “comply or else” 
principle for corporate governance in the sense that organizations are compelled to comply 
with external institutional requirements (Guerreiro et al., 2012). These pressures work as 
myths incorporated by organizations as a means to achieve legitimacy, stability and 
resources. Organizations possess a tendency for homogeneity characterized by Powell as 
institutional isomorphism (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), a process that induces an 
organization to appropriate the same behaviour as other organizations acting in the same 
environment. This can be obtained by coercive isomorphism (formal or informal pressures 
made by powerful institutions, such as the State or through cultural expectations from 
society), mimetic processes (imitations such as processes implemented by consulting 
firms) and normative pressures (brought about by professions). 
Governance builds upon the principle that the capacity of the political system to 
manage effectively is determined by the nature of institutions (Peters, 2011). One of the 
most important ways in which governance is influenced by institutions is given by the fact 
that institutions supply the linkage between structures and processes for governing in the 
sense that institutions can be featured as decision making processes. As such, law is one of 
the most basic institutions in society (Peters, 2011) and law driven requirements may 
trigger wished behaviours from organizations. Governance behaviours can be understood 
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in light of institutions but these can also be a solution for governance raised issues, that is, 
institutions may be treated as independent or dependent variables. The present study uses 
institutions as the independent variable supported by the fact that law determined pressures 
condition governance responses. These assumptions lead to accept institutional theory as 
an adequate framework for studying governance phenomena. 
Several authors (Linder & Peters, 1990; Salamon 2002; Howllet, 2005) have built 
on the assumption that policy instruments (such as law) are in themselves institutions since 
they may determine organizations behaviour (Le Galés, 2011). This assumption will also 
fundament the present research underlying the thought that laws and regulations in a social 
guardian State attach a legitimacy which is generated by the imposition of general interests 
by mandated elected representatives. 
 
2.2.2. Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures  
Institutional theory implies, for some authors (Scott, 1995), that economic agents 
are obliged to comply with external institutions’ demands (such as law originated 
requirements). In order to comply with external demands, economic agents or 
organizations may adopt different strategies, as developed by Oliver (1991).  
Oliver’s strategic response model aids in understanding that organizational choices 
are driven by other reasons than just economic rationality. She constructed a combined 
model making use of institutional and resource dependence perspectives in an attempt to 
demonstrate how entities’ behaviour could vary form passive conformity to active 
resistance as a response to external institutional pressures (Guerreiro et al., 2012). In her 
model, she developed a summary of strategic behaviours that organizations may adopt as a 
response to external institutional pressures that range from acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance and defiance to manipulation. 
Acquiescence comprises tactics of habit, imitation and compliance. This is a 
strategy of acceptance of external pressures and conformity, as a means to obtain 
legitimacy. When adopting behaviours of compromise, organisations may consider 
institutional demands unfeasible and, as such, try to balance levels of compliance with 
external demands (as a trade-off). This strategy also entails pacifying tactics and 
25 
 
bargaining. The former are an apparent conformity in the sense that organizations tend to 
comply with several demands in order to appease institutions. Bargaining implies a 
negotiating attitude towards levels of compliance.  
Avoidance is defined by Oliver (1991) as a means to avert the necessity of 
compliance by concealing noncompliance. This can be achieved by concealment tactics 
which involve mounting a façade of acquiescence. That is, organizations may engage in a 
ceremonial of acceptance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) or symbolic acceptance of institutional 
norms meaning that appearance is sometimes as important as effective compliance. Other 
avoidance tactics involve buffering and escape. Buffering consists of reducing the 
detection of nonconformity by decoupling activities in order to disguise noncompliance 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Escape is a tactic that implies simply withdrawing the 
organization from the scope of compliance (by ceasing the activities that may be subject to 
institutional pressures). 
Defiance is a more active form of resistance and it may involve dismissal, challenge 
and attack tactics (Oliver, 1991). The first of these tactics is usually used when 
organizations perceive the gains from complying with external pressures as low. It 
encompasses ignoring institutional pressures. Challenge is an offensive action as an 
attempt to defend the quality of a certain set of behaviours or beliefs. Organizations may 
consider that specific external pressures are not being properly directed and, therefore 
challenge them. Attack differs from challenge in intensity and occurs when organizations 
believe that external pressures are menacing their survival. 
Manipulation is an attempt to change external institutional pressures and is the most 
aggressive strategic response once it has as objective achieving legitimacy and neutralizing 
institutional opposition. It encompasses co-option, influence and controlling tactics. Co-
option is a tactic that consists of bringing to the entity’s “side” an institutional player thus 
obtaining legitimacy. Influence encompasses the attempt to condition and change the 
beliefs commonly accepted and lobby to obtain determined results. Finally, control implies 
efforts to exert dominance over the institutional agents. This is a more fierce response to 
institutional pressures because it tries to reverse the roles by taking control of the 
behaviours.  
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With these five strategic behaviours, Oliver (1991) put forward the conditions that 
may influence/predict organizational behaviour. She enumerated the factors that limit 
organizations in their behaviour. As such, responses to institutional external pressures 
depend on five basic questions: cause (why do external pressures exist), constituents (who 
exerts external pressure), content (what are these pressures), control (how are external 
pressures exerted) and context (where do external pressures occur) (Oliver, 1991). Based 
upon these questions, she established 10 predictive dimensions that can be summarized in 
Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Institutional Antecedents and Predicted Strategic Responses  
 
Predictive Factor 
Strategic Responses 
Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulate 
Cause 
Legitimacy 
Efficiency 
 
High 
High 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
Constituents 
Multiplicity 
Dependence 
 
Low 
High 
 
High 
High 
 
High 
Moderate 
 
High 
Low 
 
High 
Low 
Content 
Consistency 
Constraint 
 
High 
Low 
 
Moderate 
Moderate 
 
Moderate 
High 
 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
High 
Control 
Coercion 
Diffusion 
 
High 
High 
 
Moderate 
High 
 
Moderate 
Moderate 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
Context 
Uncertainty 
Interconnectedness 
 
High 
High 
 
High 
High 
 
High 
Moderate 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
Source: Oliver (1991, p.160). 
From Table 1 above can be drawn the hypothesis that where conformity with 
institutional pressures anticipates high levels of legitimacy, organizations are more prone 
to adopt an acquiescence strategic response. In a similar way, when control is exerted by 
coercion it is expected that organizations will conform to external pressures by adopting a 
strategic response of acquiescence. 
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2.3. Summary 
This chapter presented a literature review on the evolution of public management 
and public governance in order to set boundaries to its evolution as far as the present day. 
Also, it shows a brief summary of NHS composition in Portugal, as well as some examples 
of previous studies regarding hospital governance, to allow a better understanding of the 
issues that will be addressed in the research. Finally, the chapter concludes with a review 
of institutional theory and of strategic responses to institutional theory. 
It also sets the departure to the methodology chapter, where the research method 
and perspective will be drawn in order to frame the empirical study. 
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3. Research Methodology 
This chapter intends to lay down the research perspective and the research method 
used to achieve the objectives and the means to obtain the answers to the research 
questions. 
As stated previously, the main objective of this research is to analyse in which way 
State regulations on good governance in Portugal have determined PEEHs’ behaviour 
namely regarding information disclosure.  This will be achieved by procuring an answer to 
the following research question: How did Portuguese legislation efforts on good 
governance principles influence the information disclosure in PEEHs? 
In order to better construct an answer, the research question was subdivided into three 
sub questions:  
• What is the legal framework of good governance principles applicable to external 
reporting in PEEHs? 
• Which are the consequences of this legal framework in the external reporting of the 
PEEHs? 
• In which way, did the PEEHs institutionalize this legal framework in their financial 
reporting mechanisms? 
In an attempt to answer the main research question and the three sub questions this 
study adopted appropriated methodological perspective, research method and data 
collection, and theoretical framework, as will be developed in this chapter. 
 
3.1. Methodological and Epistemological Perspectives 
With the objective of studying the influence of Portuguese legislation on good 
governance principles over the external report of PEEHs, this study adopts a qualitative 
investigation methodology with an interpretative perspective based in institutional theory.  
Qualitative investigation is associated with a philosophical posture trying to explain 
the ways in which social phenomena arise are produced and interpreted. Using an 
interpretative perspective, it is intended to understand the environment underlying the 
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financial information and the ways in which it influences and/or is influenced by that 
environment. 
Within an interpretative paradigm, researchers work under the assumption that 
reality is a social construction that cannot be dealt with independently from the agents that 
create that reality (Urquhart, 2013). This paradigm considers that data is a part of the 
theory and facts must be rebuilt in accordance with an interpretative process. In social 
sciences, theories are mimetically built upon facts and a good theory lies on the 
understanding of meanings and intentions rather than on deduction. The pertinence of 
generalization depends, not of statistical inference, but of the reasonability and depth of 
logical argument used in describing results and concluding over them. Interpretative 
research aims at understanding, rather than generalizing, the social nature of accounting 
practices (Vieira, Major & Robalo, 2009). 
As such the language used by social sciences is equivocal and constantly adaptive 
to the circumstances, thus implying that meaning in social sciences is derived from facts, 
since data consists of documents, intentional behaviour and social rule, among others, 
inseparable from what they mean to the agents. That is, in an interpretative paradigm, 
researchers study the phenomena in their social contexts and aim to interpret practices and 
meanings (Urquhart, 2013). Qualitative research under the interpretative paradigm, as in 
the present study, means an attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings that 
people give to them (Myers, 2011).  
The choice between the several methods of collecting and analysing data is highly 
influenced by the nature of the research, by the theoretical positioning of the researcher 
and the adequacy to the research object. Interpretative paradigm has a subjective nature, 
involving examination and reflexion over perception in order to better understand human 
and social activities (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2000; Atkinson, 2005). 
In the empirical study performed in the present dissertation the interpretative 
paradigm has been privileged. Aiming to answer the research questions, the option for an 
investigation process that does not seek to generalize but to understand the impacts of law 
driven pressure in the adoption of certain behaviours by hospital management seemed to be 
the most appropriate (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Silverman, 2000; Atkinson, 2005; 
Diriwãchter & Valsiner, 2006; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
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Researchers in an interpretative paradigm assume a particularly relevant role in the 
sense that they are subjects and interpret social situations and phenomena (Myers, 2011, p. 
39). There is a narrow link between the researcher and the problem in the sense that the 
social values of the researcher determine the path chosen for the investigation and the 
researcher becomes himself a producer of the reality he investigates (Vieira et al., 2009). 
Interpretative researchers seek to increase people’s knowledge of theirs and other 
people practices by understanding the meanings of their actions, determined by social 
political and historical contexts, in an attempt to enhance communication and influence 
(Chua, 1986).   
 
3.2. Research Method and Data Collection 
 
Encompassed within the interpretative paradigm, this study adopts the multiple case 
studies method (Walsham, 1995). It is important to emphasize that the case studies were 
selected by theoretical sampling in which a statistical representativeness is not aimed at. In 
the selection was considered the theoretical relevance arising from the ability to explain the 
phenomena in analysis (Urquhart, 2013; Laperrière, 2010). 
Therefore, to develop this study the financial reports of 10 hospitals, for the period 
comprised between 2006 and 2011, are used as primary sources of information. The 
contents of these reports, regarding good governance disclosures, will be analysed having 
as foundation the theoretical framework provided by the institutional theory drawing upon 
Oliver’s model (1991) in order to answer the research questions. In addition, the successive 
legislation emanated by the government and other supervising entities in order to put in 
perspective evolution of PEEHs’ governance practices, through the period covered is 
analysed. Being an academic study, it will be supported in international scientific 
publications related with the study’s theme.  
The primary information was obtained by accessing the institutional sites of the 
hospitals chosen for the analysis, the Directorate General for Treasury and Finance’s site 
and the Central Administration of Health Services (CAHS) site.  
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The present study aims at determining in what ways PEEHs abided by the 
successive rules and legislation, namely regarding disclosure obligations as result from the 
MCR No. 49/2007, 28 March. As such, an analysis was performed on Management 
Reports of ten PEEHs (the biggest 5 and the smallest 5) through a six year period, as 
mentioned before, from 2006 to 2011. This analysis was performed upon a matrix of good 
governance disclosure obligations constructed upon the above mentioned Council’s 
Resolution. This matrix is depicted in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Index of Governance Disclosures 
 Main areas of disclosure obligations Items of disclosure 
Mission, objectives and general principles of conduit 
• Mission and the way in which it is 
complied with 
• Objectives and level of compliance 
Management Board members’ identification • Listing of all Board Members 
Management Board members’ remuneration • Detail of board member remuneration 
Internal and External regulations • Reference to internal regulations in force 
Acquisition of goods and services procedures 
• Explanation of rules regarding goods 
acquisition 
• Abidance with the Portuguese Public 
Contracting Code 
Transactions not performed in arm’s length • Listing of every transaction not performed according to market rules 
List of suppliers representing over 5% of total supplies • Listing of all suppliers in these 
conditions 
Economic sustainability analysis 
• Explanation on how the entity intends to 
achieve economic sustainability namely 
objectives and indicators 
Social sustainability analysis 
• Explanation on how the entity intends to 
achieve social sustainability namely 
objectives and indicators 
Environmental sustainability analysis 
• Explanation on how the entity intends to 
achieve environmental sustainability 
namely objectives and indicators 
Evaluation on the compliance of  good governance 
principles 
• Indication of the level of compliance and 
justifications for any non-compliance 
Control of disclosed information 
• Indication of the information disclosed 
and of the reasons for not disclosing all 
the mandatory information  
Ethics Code • Mention to the approval and enforcement 
of an Ethics Code 
Risk control system 
• Detail of the risk control system 
implemented with risks’ identification 
and mitigating activities 
Conflict of interests prevention mechanisms • Identification of possible conflicts and 
measures to prevent them 
 
The items in the table above represent a summary of the mandatory disclosures in 
place for the PEEHs since 2007. Regarding the legal framework, which will be developed 
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in Chapter 4, the disclosure obligations can be divided in six main areas regarding (1) 
Mission, objectives and general principles of conduit, (2) Management board and 
supervisory board structure, (3) Board remuneration and other benefits, (4) Board’s 
independence, (5) Relevant information disclosure and (6) Information disclosure 
adjustment to each PEE’s size and special features.  
As stated before, for this analysis were selected 10 hospitals. The selection was 
made upon a size criterion regarding the relative weight of delivery of health services in 
total revenue of consolidated PEEHs for the period ended in 31st December 2011. For the 
analysis were chosen the five PEEHs with highest revenue and the five PEEHs with lowest 
revenue aiming at determining if size influences the quality of report. 
As such, the five selected hospitals with highest revenues in 2011 are as follows in 
Table 3. Similarly the five hospitals with the lowest revenues are as follows in Table 4.   
 
Table 3: Highest Revenue PEEHs in 2011 
Entity Revenue Relative 
weight 
Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE 385.484.243 € 8,75% 
Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE 340.394.353 € 7,72% 
Hospital de S. João, EPE 314.242.799 € 7,13% 
Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE 295.612.688 € 6,71% 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 231.680.745 € 5,26% 
 
Table 4: Lowest Revenue PEEHs in 2011 
Entity Revenue Relative 
weight 
Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE 45.451.083 € 1,03% 
Hospital da Figueira da Foz, EPE 26.606.312 € 0,60% 
Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE 22.644.372 € 0,51% 
Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE 21.193.075 € 0,48% 
Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, EPE 21.193.075 € 0,48% 
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Some of these medical facilities are the result of mergers that took place in order to 
allow an efficiency increase and a wider range of medical services within each facility. The 
mergers resulted in the creation of several hospital centres throughout the last decade 
within the scope of PEEHs. These mergers implied that the research herewith had to be 
performed over the hospitals that eventually merged, for the years prior to the mergers. 
For a better understanding of this, Table 5 below lists all the entities merged and 
the year in which the mergers occurred. 
 
Table 5: PEEHs in 2011 and the Hospitals Merged Since 2007  
PEEHs in 2011 Institutions merged Year of the 
merger 
Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de 
Coimbra, EPE 
Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra 
Hospitais da Universidade de 
Coimbra 
Centro Hospitalar e Psiquiátrico 
de Coimbra 
2011 
Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE Hospital de Sta. Maria 
Hospital Pulido Valente 
2008 
Hospital de S. João, EPE Hospital de S. João 
Hospital de Valongo 
2011 
Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE 
Hospital Sta. Marta 
Hospital S. José 
Hospital. Stº. António dos 
Capuchos 
Hospital D. Estefânia 
2007 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
Hospital Stº António 
Hospital Maria Pia 
Maternidade Júlio Dinis 
2007 
Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE Hospital Pêro da Covilhã Hospital 
do Fundão 
2005 
Hospital da Figueira da Foz, EPE - - 
Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE - - 
Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE - - 
Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, EPE 
Hospital Pedro Hispano 
Centro de Saúde de Leça da 
Palmeira 
Centro de Saúde da Sra. da Hora 
Centro de Saúde de S. Mamede de 
Infesta 
Centro de Saúde de Matosinhos 
Centro de diagnóstico 
Pneumológico 
Unidade de Saúde Pública 
2005 
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3.3. Theoretical Framework 
This study will be supported in the New Institutionalism or New institutional 
sociology, as developed by Powell & DiMaggio (1991). This theory will be complemented 
with an approach to institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ritual 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977), in the sense that there may be a time gap between the legislator’ 
will and the effective compliance from the institutions. Institutional theory can be useful in 
the decision making process of adopting or not certain behaviours through the complexity 
responses of external institutional pressures (in the present study law driven pressures). 
Institutional theory will be combined with Oliver’s (1991) analytical framework applied to 
governance disclosure practices in an attempt to show PEEHs’ responses to law driven 
requirements in the Portuguese health rendering services field. 
This research seeks to understand how law driven pressures reflect on PEEHs’ 
behaviour regarding governance principles disclosure. The argument lies upon the thought 
that PEEHs’ choices represent a strategic response to laws emanated by government 
(namely MCR No.49/2007). There is little doubt that, when law driven, pressures are likely 
to be positively accepted by organizations. The purpose of this research lies not entirely on 
the compliance of PEEHs by itself but in how this compliance is carried out.  
Using Oliver’s model, this research aims at understanding how Portuguese PEEHs 
responded to law driven pressures. By adopting Oliver’s model (1991), this research seeks 
to understand, given the five predictive factors (Cause, Constituents, Content, Control and 
Context) in the model and when transposed to the Portuguese public health rendering 
services, what is the strategic response from PEEHs regarding good governance principles 
disclosure pressures. 
In the present study the predictive factors considered as cause are enhancing 
legitimacy and increasing efficiency, the State is the constituent (since compliance with a 
legal disposition is at stake, what provides the content), control is exerted by legal coercion 
and context is one of clear established rules for the Portuguese NHS and PEEHs’ boards 
are aware of all the features of their activity. As such, it is expected that PEEHs adopt an 
acquiescence response strategy to law driven external pressures. 
Another issue focused in this research is the gap of time between the conception of 
an innovation and its implementation (Lawrence et al., 2001). That is, the analysis on how 
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long it takes an organization to adopt institutional external pressures. Picking the three 
dimensions of isomorphism above mentioned it would be expected that law driven 
pressures (coercive isomorphism) would have an immediate repercussion by fear of 
penalties, whereas normative and mimetic pressures would take more time to be 
implemented as a result of a more gradual process. 
Next chapter will verse on the contextualization of the Portuguese NHS and its 
evolution for the last thirty years.  
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4. The Context of the Portuguese NHS 
This chapter is organized in two parts. The first comprises the evolution of the 
Portuguese NHS throughout the last thirty years and is followed by the legal framework 
regarding PEEs in general and NHS entities in particular, in order to understand the 
institutional external pressures put upon these entities. 
 
4.1. Evolution of the Portuguese National Health Service 
The Portuguese NHS was created in 1979 and is primarily funded by taxation 
revenues. The Portuguese Constitution states that the NHS is universal, comprehensive and 
tending to be free of charge. Accordingly, every citizen is entitled to health protection and 
care regardless of his social status. It is the State’s duty to promote a geographic coverage 
of health services, such as, to assure access to all the population (Raposo & Harfouche, 
2011). 
The Portuguese NHS comprises three types of health services rendering 
institutions: PEEHs; Public Administrative Services Hospitals (PASHs) and Private Public 
Partnership Hospitals (PPPHs). Even though they have different denominations, their 
purposes are much alike. 
In 2011, the NHS funding, amounting to approximately 8.250 million euro, 
represented 5% of the Portuguese National budget and was majorly funded through 
taxation. In the same year, the number of PEEHs amounted to 42 entities, while there were 
only 19 PASHs and 3 PPPHs. 
For the last 30 years, Portugal has tried to reform the NHS and adopt the best 
management practices. This reform followed two paths: the corporatization of public 
hospitals and the redefinition of hospital services supplies (Raposo & Harfouche, 2011). 
The corporatization of public hospitals took place in two waves. Firstly, the 
government transformed several public hospitals into public companies (Hospitais, S.A.), 
as such, 36 public hospitals were transformed into 31 public companies. The urgency for a 
health system reform was being felt as a result of hospital budget increase with no 
correlation in production. Also, there was a culture of disregard for public funds’ allocation 
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and deficient competition spirit among hospital professionals. The first steps into reform 
had several objectives that ranged from quantitative to qualitative levels. According to 
Raposo and Harfouche (2011), these objectives can be summarized as follows: 
• NPM based business management culture with focus on monitoring and 
accountability policies; 
• Promotion of more flexible unit management namely by giving financial, 
administrative and operational autonomy; 
• Budget restriction, in order to contain public deficit, associated with 
efficiency increase; and 
• Hospital production (healthcare services) based funding. 
These objectives boosted the first movement of health services reform which 
started with the already mentioned corporatization of public hospitals into Public Company 
Hospitals (Hospitais, S.A.). This corporatization allowed the Hospitais, S.A. to be managed 
with greater autonomy followed by a new legal framework, hoping that through mimetic 
isomorphism, the new management practices would spread to all the hospitals, including 
PASHs. 
The transformation of PASHs into Hospitais S.A. gave rise to the suspicion that 
government was preparing to privatize these entities. Thus, in 2005, the Hospitais S.A. 
were redenominated to PEEHs in order to clarify that these institutions would be kept 
within the State’s sphere. It was this event that started the second movement of health 
services reform, characterized by the expansion of PEEHs through the transformation of 
PASHs, the concentration of units, establishing hospital centres and the creation of local 
health units (Raposo & Harfouche, 2011). Once more, the implementation of these 
measures intended to focus on increase autonomy and management accountability, in an 
attempt to bring together PEEHs’ management features to a more market like tradition. 
   The transformation of PASHs into PEEHs begins with an application from the 
entity, which is analysed by both the Finance and Health Ministries. Criteria for this 
transformation comprise: size, location and type of health services rendered. Nowadays, 
most of the PASHs transformed into PEEHs undergo simultaneously a concentration 
process and become Hospital Centres (that is, instead of a sole medical facility, there are 
several hospitals under the same management).  
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The health services rendering entities belonging to NHS are encompassed by a 
specific statute, Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December, which is in accordance with the 
government strategies for the sector. The Finance and Health Ministries have the joint 
trusteeship of PEEHs regarding financial arrangements. As such, they are vested with 
several responsibilities as defined in article no.10 of the Decree-law: 
• Budget and activities’ plans approval; 
• Annual report’s approval; 
• Building purchase or sale’s approval as well as any mortgages, given the 
supervisory body’s approval; 
• Investments authorization when not budget considered as well as any loan 
whose amount exceeds 10% of statutory capital; 
• Determine capital reduction or increase; 
• Authorize the participation of PEEHs in other health related entities; and 
• Authorize any other actions that as a result from legal disposition require 
their approval. 
Nevertheless the Ministries responsibilities, several actions remain the boards’ 
responsibility and initiative. These include internal regulations’ implementation and 
regulation as well as non-statutory issues such as hospital committees’ creation (internal 
control, internal audit). Boards should be dimensioned in accordance with the law but 
taking into account rationality and efficiency criteria so that there are not situations of 
oversizing. 
Through the PEEHs’ regime, management boards were given autonomy to define 
clinical areas where to provide medical services. Nevertheless, these services are expected 
to cover a determined geographical area. Whenever that is not possible there is a hospital 
referral network (Raposo & Harfouche, 2011) that enables patients to be redirected to 
alternative hospitals in accordance with the medical speciality required. This network was 
constructed on the population needs’ historical data, pre-existing facilities, equipment and 
human resources availability. From this it can be inferred that even though management 
boards can propose to create new clinical specialties within their hospitals, they still need 
the health ministry’s authorization which means that in reality this autonomy is fictitious 
(Raposo & Harfouche, 2011).  
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Below management boards, PEEHs have several organic units and departments, 
organized to advise the boards on specific issues. Some of these units or departments are 
mandatory (such as the internal audit committee) while others may be instituted by 
management’s initiative. Regarding working arrangements, the workers in PEEHs are 
subject to the rules in the Portuguese Labour Code and any supplementary labour rules in 
force at the time.  
PEEHs’ funding is based upon production levels. Each year, hospitals sign a 
contrato-programa (programme contracts) whereby they commit themselves with certain 
levels of production. These contracts reflect the expectations of government, expressed 
through the Administração Central dos Serviços de Saúde [Central Administration of 
Health Services (CAHS)], rather than Hospital Management Boards’ ability to negotiate. 
According to Barros and Simões (2007, p. 54):   
A major innovation introduced by this change was the contratos programa (contracts), through 
which the hospital commits to certain levels of activities (admissions, external consultations, 
emergency department episodes and ambulatory care cases) in return for an overall yearly budget. 
Negative financial results are to be internalized by the hospital.  
Hospitals must comply with performance objectives both at national and regional 
level. These objectives are laid down in the contract programmes and regard indicators 
such as unit cost per patient, and operational results at national level and payroll expenses, 
supplies and sundry expenses at regional level. Monitoring is the responsibility of CAHS 
and the Administrações Regionais de Saúde [Regional Health Services Administrations 
(RHSA)].  
Along with the performance objectives compliance on which depend the PEEH´s 
funding, there have been some recent developments regarding accountability. As a 
consequence, management has to comply with disclosure obligations among which can be 
highlighted: management report, financial statements for the year, budget and activity’s 
plan and the external auditor’s report. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the focus is being put in monitoring and 
supervising which leads us to another issue. The preparation of reporting and the 
information systems’ integration has yet to cover a long distance. Even though all the 
PEEHs have to use the Plano Oficial de Contabilidade do Ministério da Saúde (Official 
Accounting Plan for the Ministry of Health), most PASHs still operate on a cash basis, 
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which makes comparison impossible. One of the recommendations of the MoU was that 
these entities should adopt the normalised accounting system4 in 2014, which means that 
these entities are experiencing changes in their information systems to allow them to fulfil 
with that obligation. 
 
4.2. Legal Framework 
In the following subchapters is presented the Portuguese legal framework 
concerning the NHS. 
 
4.2.1. The Portuguese NHS Legal Framework 
Portugal is commonly associated with the “Continental European Model” regarding 
the manner in which changes are implemented and the environment factors that condition 
these changes. Portuguese commercial law goes back to the French law (1809) – Code de 
Commerce – which was adopted by a significant number of countries at the time (Portugal 
included) (Nobes, 1996). As such, traditionally, law is one of the most important drivers of 
change, which is reflected also on NHS.  
Portuguese health reforms regarding organization systems date from the early 
nineties with Law No. 48/90, 24 August, which established the Fundamental Principles of 
the Portuguese NHS. This Law intended to set up the framework of health services and of 
the NHS, and to define the responsibilities of the State and of the health services rendering 
entities. It was this provision that characterized the main features of the institutions 
belonging to the Ministry of Health among which is the NHS. Accordingly, it is the 
government’s responsibility the definition of health policy, and its supervision. The 
Ministry of Health’s services are in charge of regulation, guidance, planning, evaluation 
and inspection duties regarding the NHS which, at regional level, is managed by (RHSA). 
In every aspect, these services belong to the public sector and must abide by the rules in 
place since they operate in its sphere. 
                                                 
4
 The PEEH will have to adopt the accounting system in place for the private sector entities (namely Sistema 
de Normalização Contabilístico). 
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In 1993, Following the Fundamental Principles of the Portuguese NHS, was 
established the NHS statute through the Decree-law No. 11/93, 15 January. This statute 
defines NHS as the hierarchized group of health rendering services’ public institutions and 
services operating under the Health Ministry’s supervision or trusteeship. It is divided in 
five RHSA, which are geographically integrated. Every service or organization within 
NHS has to be created by law and classified in accordance with the nature of its activities, 
as defined by the Health Ministry. At this time, there were only PASHs in Portugal 
operating without any specific legal regime.  
As time went by, it became necessary to put some order into the several institutions 
belonging to the State and, in 1999, it was approved the Decree-law No. 558/99, 17 
December, defining the legal regime of SOEs and public entities. This provision updated 
the legal definition of state-owned company nearing it to the European concepts which 
broaden the universe of this kind of companies. It was made an attempt to articulate the 
several State-owned companies with the shareholders’ interests, basically through the 
implementation of additional reporting obligations and strategic management guidelines 
both in national and european contexts, namely in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty. 
The Amsterdam Treaty, in its article no.7, established that State members shall zeal for 
these companies to operate within principles and conditions to persecute their missions. 
This Decree-law tried to bring together the State-owned companies regime to the paradigm 
of the private held companies. According to the above mentioned Decree-law, a State-
owned company is an entity commercially established in which the State or other State-
owned companies may solely or in group, dominate through the detention of the majority 
of vote rights and/or the ability to destitute or nominate members of the board. This 
provision also establishes the mission of State-owned companies as contributing to the 
economic and financial balance of the public sector and satisfying the necessities of the 
population. These companies are subject to private law and therefore to tax legislation and 
competition rules applicable to private held companies. The State as shareholder defines 
strategic guidelines which may involve economic objectives and financial control in order 
to insure management’s legality, economy, efficiency and efficacy, and the companies 
should adopt an adequate internal control system in order to assure the fairness of the 
financial statements. Beyond the reporting legally demanded for private held companies, 
State-owned companies have to present yearly activity plans, yearly budgets financial 
statements and trimestral budgeting and any other information or documents as requested 
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to insure good public funds’ management. This Decree-law also establishes, in its article 
no. 23, the Public Enterprise Entity (PEE), which is an entity created by Decree-law and 
owned by the State or another public entity. These PEEs are endowed with financial and 
administrative autonomy and do not follow public accounting standards. They are also 
subject to the State’s superintendence and ruled by private law, as seen above. 
In 2002, the Portuguese Parliament passed the Law No. 27/2002, 8 November, in 
which a new regime for hospital management was approved updating Law 48/90, above 
mentioned. Through this provision were established the several types of legal form in 
which hospitals could be organized, among which were public institutions, with juridical 
form endowed with financial and economic autonomy with an enterprise nature like. In 
article no. 5, this law defined the specific principles of hospital management, such as the 
development of the activity in accordance with management forecast instruments, namely 
activity plans (yearly and multiannual), budgets and other, assurance of quality health 
services with resources control, development of a judicious management fulfilling the 
objectives designed by the ministry of health, and the compliance with the generally 
accepted principles in accounting for the Ministry of Health. This law also established the 
regime by which the PEEHs should operate. Thus, these institutions should abide, by their 
establishment diploma, any rules in force for the Portuguese NHS in accordance with their 
legal nature and complementarily by the PEEs legal regime.  
Following Law No.27/2002, 8 November, the Portuguese government passed 
Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December, which transformed into PEEHs, the 36 existing 
Public Company Hospitals (Hospitais S.A.), established their juridical regime and defined 
their statutes. This change into PEEHs was performed considering that these hospitals 
should have a legal form enabling a higher government intervention regarding strategic 
guidelines and superintendence necessary to the adequate functioning of the Portuguese 
NHS. This legal provision states that entities belonging to the Portuguese NHS should 
unequivocally present a public nature and be endowed with management instruments 
adequate to this nature. As specified in the law, it is expected that the PEEHs status will be 
extended to all the hospitals belonging to the Portuguese NHS, even those belonging to 
Public Administration. Thus, it is defended that the provisions made by Decree-law No. 
558/99, 17 December, above mentioned, regarding PEEs, are the most adequate to the 
legal form for the Portuguese hospitals. Furthermore, the Decree-law establishes a statutes 
44 
 
model to be adopted by every PEEH. This model was created to prevent the adoption of 
different statutes between entities which are substantially identical and sets out, amidst 
others, share capital structure, the board composition and duties and the supervisory body. 
The legal regime of PEEHs complies with the Decree-law No. 558/99, 17 December, 
provisions and with the particularities arising from the present Decree-law. As such, it 
defines the supervising duties of the Ministries of Health and of Finance as well as the 
organic structures in which the PEEHs should be organized. It also establishes the financial 
rules by which the PEEHs should abide. As a result, the PEEHs shall submit to those 
ministries, the activities plan and budgets every year by the end of October, the yearly 
financial reporting by the end of March and economic indicators as and when defined by 
those ministries. 
Regarding goods and services acquisition, the Decree-law states that they are ruled 
by private law, notwithstanding the need to comply with public contracting European 
legislation. In this particular, the hospitals’ internal regulations must assure that 
compliance. 
After establishing the PEEHs, it was necessary to redefine the status of the public 
manager which had become obsolete. The previous regime had been published by Decree-
law No. 464/82, 9 December, and needed to be updated to the demands of public 
governance requirements. Accordingly, in 2007, the Portuguese Ministry of Finance 
passed the Decree-law No. 71/2007, 27 March, which attempted to address the 
shortcomings of the previous legislation following both the OECD and the European 
Commission recommendations on good governance. This Decree-law sets up an integrated 
public managers’ regime perfectly up-to-date covering every SOE, regardless of its legal 
form, defining management’s role in PEEs and the rules by which it has to abide, namely 
managers nomination, performance and resignation. Based upon the recognition of the 
public management importance in promoting social and economic development and 
satisfying the population needs, this Decree-law did not, nevertheless, forget the high 
levels of demand, rigorousness, efficiency and transparency which are, themselves, the 
result of an ethics in public service. As such, particular emphasis was cast upon the 
incompatibilities regime, performance analysis, remunerations fixation, social benefits 
ethic rules and international good practices. In this Decree-law, public manager is defined 
as anyone designated for member of the board of a PEE, as considered in Decree-law No. 
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558/99, above mentioned. The duties of a public manager are detailed in article no.5 and 
comprise: the accomplishment of the objectives of the company, as established by 
shareholders’ meetings or by management contracts; assurance of the fulfilment of the 
company’s strategy, supervision, control and verification of the evolution of activities; risk 
evaluation and management; assurance of the veracity and reliability of the information 
regarding the company as well as their confidentiality. Finally, it is the public manager’s 
duty to keep professional secrecy on any matters arising from his functions.  
Even though management’s independence is safeguarded, Decree-law No. 558/99 
determines that it should be evaluated, being this evaluation a responsibility of the finance 
and the corresponding area ministries’ responsibility (in health services PEEH – the 
Ministry of Health). The Decree-law No. 71/2007, 27 March proceeds by regulating 
several issues regarding managements’ nomination, incompatibilities, and resignation and 
remunerations policy. The Decree also establishes a fixed and a variable component for the 
public manager’s remuneration as well as social benefits conditions, and allowances. 
Finally, this Decree-law dedicates a chapter to governance and transparency. In it is stated 
that public managers have to submit to ethical standards and internationally accepted good 
practices in transparency, respect for competition and stakeholders and reporting on the 
company and its operations. In 2008, in compliance with article no. 6 of the Decree-law 
No. 71/2007, 27 March, the Ministry of Health approves Ordinance No. 3596/2008 
creating a study committee for the evaluation of PEEHs’ management boards. This 
committee had the following attributions: pre-test the evaluation model in a sample of 
PEEHs, propose a final evaluation model and any alterations deemed necessary. Following 
this committee, a technical group was created by Ordinance No. 10823/2010, 1 July, with 
the incumbency of proposing a new organizational structure for the Portuguese NHS’s 
hospitals including the PEEHs. Both of these committees have not yet provided any report. 
 
4.2.2. Legal Measures Concerning Principles of Good Governance and Information 
Disclosure 
It was in accordance with article no.37 of the Decree-law No. 71/2007, 27 March, 
that the Portuguese government passed MCR No. 49/2007, 28 March, by which were 
approved the PEEs principles of good governance and information disclosures. In this 
provision, the government admits that, due to their importance in the Portuguese social and 
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economic reality, the PEEs must adopt governance models that not only achieve high 
performance levels but also that contribute to spread good practices to public 
administration services in these matters including economic social and environmental 
sustainability. The context is one in which companies should commit to social 
responsibilities, namely, regarding equal opportunities and environmentally correct 
practices, in accordance with economic development and growth. Therefore, it is necessary 
to institute decision making, financial reporting and supervision mechanisms that induce an 
efficient use of the available resources. In other words, it is necessary to implement 
governance models with economic and social value for the companies. However, good 
governance is not attainable with mere legislation initiatives (by coercive isomorphism). It 
is fundamental to adopt good governance practices in order to stimulate economic agents 
towards efficiency and equity. As such, the State must give the example and this is why 
this MCR No.49/2007 begins by setting the principles of good governance regarding the 
State as shareholder in an attempt to remedy the shortcomings of the few existent 
reflections on good governance regarding its role. This represented an effort to apply good 
governance practices not only to the agents (the entities’ managers) but also to the 
principal (the State). Thus, the principles are divided in the State’s role as shareholder and 
as stakeholder. The recommendations put an emphasis in transparency and guidelines 
establishment and evaluation, as well as supervision. As stakeholder, the State should 
operate within market conditions and fulfil its obligations on a timely basis. As to the PEEs 
principles of good governance, these are divided in six sections. Section one regards 
mission, objectives and general principles, and sets out the manner in which the PEEs must 
abide to them as well as their reporting requirements. The PEEs must prepare their 
activities’ plan and budgets in accordance with their financing structure in obeisance to 
their mission statement and objectives. They are also required to define economic, social 
and environmental sustainability strategies. Equity plans must be adopted in order to 
eliminate gender discrimination and, on a yearly basis, each PEE should inform the 
respective ministry of the way in which its mission, objectives and principles were attained 
(mentioning social responsibility’s policy and competitiveness, especially by way of 
research development). PEEs have to abide to the laws in force and be ethically 
irreproachable regarding taxation rules. They should also treat their workers with respect 
and integrity promoting their professional enhancement. Stakeholders should be treated 
with equity and goods and services’ acquisitions procedures should be publicly disclosed. 
By year end the PEEs should disclose every transaction not made under “arm’s length” and 
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a list of suppliers representing over 5% of total acquisitions, if above 1 million euro. 
Confidential or undocumented expenses are strictly prohibited and an ethics code must be 
implemented and disclosed by each PEE. The compliance with this kind of disclosures 
underlines a coercive pressure from the State by enforcing quantitative mandatory 
disclosures.  
Section two regards management and supervision bodies. The MCR imposes that 
board and supervision bodies’ dimension should be adjusted to the companies size and 
complexity, in order to assure efficiency in the decision making process and an adequate 
supervision capacity. SOEs should have a governance model able to assure the effective 
segregation of duties’ between executive management and supervision. Bigger companies 
must create specialized bodies in which an audit or a governance committee should be 
included, non-executive board members or the supervision body should, by year end, 
provide an evaluation report on the board’s individual performance as well as on the 
governance mechanisms in place. The financial statements of SOEs must be audited by an 
independent entity whose rotation has to be assured. 
Section three of the good governance principles committed to the SOEs concerns 
the board’s remuneration and other benefits. Companies should disclose total 
remunerations, both variable and fixed, whatever their nature, as well as the supervisory 
bodies fees. Every benefit, such as health insurances, car allowance or others should be 
object of the same disclosure obligations in an attempt of gaining and assuring 
transparency in Board members retribution that can be seen as a way of legitimating the 
Boards. 
 In section four, the council’s resolution establishes that members of the board 
should excuse themselves from intervening in any decision which might involve their own 
interests, namely regarding expenses. Besides, at the time of their designation, and 
whenever justified, they must declare to the board and tax authorities any share interests in 
the company as well as any special relations with the stakeholders.  
Social bodies of SOEs should publicly disclose any information which is liable to 
relevantly affect the financial or economic situation of the company according to what is 
stated in section five of this legal provision. 
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Finally, in section six, the resolution establishes the “comply or explain” figure for 
those companies that due to their size or any legal or commercial legitimate reason do not 
follow the above detailed principles.  
Regarding information disclosure principles, the Portuguese Department of 
Treasury will create a SOEs’ internet site where all the information regarding good 
governance principles must be disclosed, notwithstanding the disclosure in the companies’ 
sites. This information should be of free access to everyone. Moreover, the management 
report of these companies should include a chapter regarding good governance in which, 
besides the principles before described, internal regulations, and an evaluation on the level 
of compliance should be disclosed.  
In 2007, the government considered that Decree-law No. 558/99, 17 December had 
become outdated and therefore passed Decree-law No. 300/2007, 23 August, introducing 
some changes to SOEs’ statute. The main changes reflect an attempt to bring together the 
SOEs regime with the public manager’s statute approved by Decree-law No.71/2007, 27 
March, above detailed. Considering that growing attention is paid to good governance 
practices and internal organization, this provision includes the creation of specialized 
committees within the companies, such as an audit committee and an evaluation 
committee. This Decree-law intends to assure the effective definition of strategic 
management guidelines in SOEs, enhancing their role in satisfying public needs. As such, 
it sets up three levels of management guidelines, strategic guidelines for all the SOEs, 
general guidelines for each sector and specific guidelines for specific companies. The 
respect for these guidelines will be considered in the management’s performance 
evaluation.  
In last, there is a strengthening of the control mechanisms and special disclosure 
duties. To the disclosure duties specified in Decree-law No. 558/99 above are added yearly 
investment plans and financing sources as well as trimestral budget analysis. The Decree-
law No. 300/2007 considers also two new articles (no.13-A and 13-B) regarding 
mandatory information to be disclosed in the management report and yearly disclosure to 
be published in 2nd series of the Portuguese Official State Gazette. The former includes: 
management guidelines; management and specialized committees compositions; board 
members’ individual curricula; indication of executive and non-executive members of the 
board; number of board members; and independent auditor’s identification and report. 
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Regarding information disclosures, this provision states that the SOEs should disclose 
board composition, board member’s curricula and identification and any functions in other 
companies as well as all the remunerations earned. This Decree-law also establishes the 
specialized committees’ attributions and duties and defines a board regulation to be created 
by every SOE.  
By MCR No. 70/2008, 17 April, the government tried to cast some light upon what 
should be the above mentioned strategic guidelines for the PEEs. Since Decree-law No. 
300/2007 only established the three levels of guidelines, the council resolution defines the 
specific detailed guidelines for the PEEs. In this provision is defined the PEEs general 
framework of action by which PEEs should operate within the government objectives in a 
rational way, pursuing a permanent efficiency optimization, high quality services and 
safety concerns. PEEs should be socially responsible and pursue social and environmental 
objectives, promoting competitiveness consumer protection, as well as professional and 
personal enhancement of their workers and equity within ethical standards. PEEs engaged 
in general economic interest services should balance quantitative with qualitative levels of 
public service in a framework of economic, social and financial sustainability. The major 
strategic guidelines consist of: financial indicators compliance (this provision sets several 
financial indicators such as returns, efficiency, and days in receivables and suppliers); 
service quality; human resources policy and equity promotion; social benefits; 
sustainability and innovation policy; information systems and risk management, and 
ecological purchase policy. These guidelines should be evaluated on a six-month basis, 
being the result of this evaluation communicated to the ministry in charge. This is the 
minimum framework by which the PEEs should abide but they can establish additional 
objectives and indicators adapted to their specific activity. 
In line with the reforms in the public sector and in the PEEs carried out by 
successive governments, the Portuguese Parliament has approved, by Parliament’s 
Resolution No. 53/2011, 18 February, a recommendation to the government to implement 
measures tending to enforce the “comply or explain” principle in SOEs. This resolution 
states that regarding good governance and transparency, MCR No. 49/2007 should be fully 
complied with and completed with measures, such as risk management and internal 
controls system implementation, irregularities disclosure policy (to be made by the board), 
auditor’s rotation every three mandates, strengthening the disclosures on each SOE’s site 
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namely in what respects the “comply or explain” principle. This Resolution also 
recommends the rationalization of board structures, mentioning that the number of 
members should only exceed three when the SOE is of such complexity as to require it, 
never in any circumstance supersede five members. Furthermore, it recommends that 
board’s remuneration should have a ceiling and variable components should have in 
consideration pre-determined specific objectives compliance. Boards’ benefits are also 
recommended to be reduced such as company’s credit card eradication and car allowance 
limitation. Finally, this resolution proposes the creation for a supervision committee per 
sector that defines an adequate governance model and assures a balance between 
management’s complexity and remuneration within different SOEs in the same sector. 
In 2012, following the recommendations made in the MoU, and Parliament’s 
Resolution No. 53/2011, the government passed Decree-law No. 8/2012, 18 January, by 
which is updated the Decree-law No. 71/2007 regarding public manager’s statute. This 
Decree-law places great emphasis in public managers’ recruitment, remuneration and 
performance evaluation. In fact, this provision tries to implement management by 
objectives, rationalizing remunerations and promoting public expenses reduction, by 
adopting measures tending to reduce public managers benefits, such as forbidding 
company’s credit card, limiting car allowances and representation expenses. 
In summary, throughout the past thirty years there has been an increasing effort to 
endow the PEEs with governance practices that enable them to become more competitive 
and compliant with the demands of international organizations and in line with what is 
being done by other countries and private sector companies. Nowadays, good governance 
practices encompass disclosure requirements that include mission statements, trade 
transparency (through the disclosure of important suppliers and acquisition regulations), 
sustainability efforts, code of ethics, boards’ independence and remunerations. 
There is a growing awareness from the shareholder (the State) of the importance of 
good governance practices and their correspondent disclosures, which has been shown by 
the successive legislation efforts.  
In the next chapter will be conducted an analysis on how the hospitals have adopted 
these good governance disclosure practices requirements.  
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5. Empirical study 
 
In this chapter it will be presented a brief history of the hospitals selected for this 
study, followed by the analysis of the disclosed information by each hospital to better 
understand the level of compliance with good governance disclosure practices. Finally, the 
results are analysed at the light of the institutional pressures and strategic responses 
theoretical framework adopted in this study. 
5.1. Brief History of the Hospitals Analysed 
All of the hospitals analysed have once been part of PASHs, therefore it is 
important to learn how they were first established and came to be transformed into PEEHs. 
All the information regarding this section was obtained on the websites of each hospital 
and their annual reports as well as on the legal provisions regarding their establishment. 
 
Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE 
Today one of the biggest hospital centres in Europe, this PEEH results from the 
merge, in 2011, of two PEEHs (Hospitais e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE and Centro 
Hospitalar de Coimbra, EPE) with a PASH (Centro Hospitalar Psiquiátrico de Coimbra), 
by Decree-law No. 30/2011, 2 March. Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra, EPE go 
back to 1774, when their management was transferred to the University of Coimbra. From 
1870 until 1961, they operated in three separate buildings and, in 1987, moved to a new 
building constructed for the effect. Centro Hospitalar Psiquiátrico de Coimbra was created 
during the dictatorship as a psychiatric facility adapting an ancient monastery. It was later 
transferred to the NHS and became a PASH. Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra, EPE 
comprises a maternity, a paediatric hospital inaugurated in 1977 and a general hospital 
inaugurated in 1973. 
The PEEHs merged (Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra, EPE and Hospitais da 
Universidade de Coimbra, EPE) were transformed into PEEHs in 2007 (Centro Hospitalar 
de Coimbra EPE, by the Decree-law No. 50-A/2007, 28 February) and 2008 (Hospitais da 
Universidade de Coimbra, EPE, by the Decree-law No. 180/2008, 26 August) and were 
formerly PASHs. Centro Hospitalar Psiquiátrico de Coimbra was a PASH established in 
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2008 by ordinance No. 1580/2007, 12 December, and, unlike other PASHs developed 
entrepreneurial reporting habits. For this study were analysed the separate annual reports of 
these entities since 2007 until the merge in 2011. For this year it was analysed the annual 
report of Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE, the entity that resulted from 
the merger of the different entities. (http://www.chc.min-saude.pt, 2013)5. 
 
Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte 
This PEEH resulted from the merge, in 2008, of Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE and 
Hospital Pulido Valente, EPE in order to comply with Decree-law No. 23/2008, 8 
February. Hospital Pulido Valente, EPE was a sanatorium built in 1910 and became a 
PASH in 1979. It was transformed in a public entity in 2002 and afterwards, in 2005, in 
PEEH by the Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December. Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE was 
created in 1954 as a PASH and a university hospital. It was transformed into a PEEH in 
January 2006. Nowadays, the two hospitals render healthcare services to a population of 
approximately, 373.000 people and employ 6.700 labourers. This hospital centre has the 
most procured urgency unit of Lisbon (http://www.hsm.min-saude.pt, 2013)6. 
 
Centro Hospitalar de São João, EPE 
This hospital centre was created by Decree-law in 2011, and results from the merge 
of Hospital de S. João and Hospital de Nª Sª da Conceição de Valongo. Hospital de S. 
João initiated its activity in 1959 and its building was sibling to Hospital de Santa Maria, 
EPE in Lisbon. Similarly to that hospital, Hospital de S. João is also a university hospital 
and was transformed into a PEEH in 2006. This hospital is one of the two major healthcare 
facilities in the North of Portugal (the other being Hospital Geral de Santo António also in 
Porto). Hospital de Nª Sª da Conceição de Valongo was established in 1936 and belonged 
to Santa Casa da Misericórdia,7 until the creation of the Portuguese NHS, in 1979, when it 
became a PASH. This healthcare unit serves approximately 300.000 inhabitants. Since 
                                                 
5
 http://www.chc.min-saude.pt accessed in 14th July 2013. 
6
 http://www.hsm.min-saude.pt accessed in 14th July 2013. 
7
 Santa Casa da Misericórdia was funded by Queen D. Leonor in 1500 as an institution aimed at providing 
assistance to the needed. It was created locally in each community and many of the hospitals in Portugal were 
once property of these institutions. They were primarily funded by donors. Its name can be translated to 
Brotherhood of the Holy House of Mercy. 
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Hospital de Valongo was a PASH until the merge, this study focused in the analysis of 
Hospital de S. João, EPE’s annual report from 2006 to 2011 (http://www.chsj.pt, 2013)8. 
 
Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE 
Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Central, EPE was created through Decree-law No. 50-
A/2007 in March 2007, and comprised Hospital de S. José, Hospital de S. António dos 
Capuchos, Hospital de Santa Marta and Hospital D. Estefânia. Hospital de S. José is 
located in a former Jesuitical school and initiated its activity as a health services provider 
when the 1755 earthquake in Lisbon destroyed the Hospital de Todos os Santos. It was a 
PASH until the merge into Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Central, EPE. Hospital de S. António 
dos Capuchos was a former nunnery which was officially transformed into a hospital in 
1928. As Hospital de S. José, it was a PASH until the merge. Hospital de Santa Marta, 
EPE, a former nunnery, was converted to a healthcare facility in 1910. Since the 
foundation of the Portuguese NHS it became a PASH which was transformed in a Public 
Company in 2002 and, in 2005, in a PEEH through Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 
December. It is a medical school and serves approximately 450.000 inhabitants. Finally, 
Hospital D. Estefânia was the first hospital-intended construction in Lisbon and was 
inaugurated in 1877, as the first paediatric hospital in Portugal. In 1979, when the 
Portuguese NHS was created, this hospital became a PASH. In the future these hospitals 
will be replaced by a new facility called Hospital de Todos os Santos (Centro Hospitalar 
de Lisboa Oriental, EPE), which is expected to open in 2016. Since Hospital de Santa 
Marta, EPE was the only PEEH before the merger, for the year prior to 2007, the study 
focused only on its annual report (http://www.chlc.min-saude.pt, 2013)9. 
 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto  
In 2007, the government passed Decree-law No. 326/2007, 28 September, 
determining the merge of Hospital Geral de Santo António, EPE, Hospital Maria Pia and 
Maternidade Júlio Dinis into Centro Hospitalar do Porto. Hospital Geral de Santo 
António was established in 1799 in Porto, as a replacement for a medical facility that no 
                                                 
8
 http://www.chsj.pt accessed in 14th July, 2013. 
9
 http://www.chlc.min-saude.pt accessed in 14th July, 2013. 
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longer had conditions to maintain its activity. It belonged to Santa Casa da Misericórdia 
and, with the creation of the Portuguese NHS, it was integrated as a PASH. In 2002, it was 
transformed in a public company, and in 2005, in a PEEH. Hospital Maria Pia was 
founded in 1882 as an Association to promote healthcare services for children in Porto. 
After 1974, the Hospital was nationalized and incorporated in the NHS, in 1979, as a 
PASH. Maternidade Júlio Dinis was established in 1939 as a maternity and, since its 
creation, it has always been a public hospital, which was integrated in the Portuguese NHS 
in 1979.  This Hospital Centre is also a university hospital and serves, approximately, 
600.000 people. In 2011, a new hospital was merged into Centro Hospitalar do Porto, 
EPE, the Hospital Joaquim Urbano. This hospital, Hospital Joaquim Urbano, belonged to 
and was built in 1884 by Santa Casa da Misericordia, to isolate and treat patients with 
cholera. For more than 100 years it treated only infectious and contagious illnesses. In 
1914 the hospital was transferred to the states’ ownership and became a PASH after 1979.  
Since there are no annual reports for the PASH, this study focused on the annual reports of 
Hospital Geral de Santo António, EPE (which is undoubtedly the most important facility 
regarding size) previous to 2007 and on the annual reports of Centro Hospitalar do Porto, 
EPE from 2007 onwards (http://www.chporto.pt/, 2013)10. 
 
Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE 
It comprises two facilities: Hospital Pêro da Covilhã and Hospital do Fundão. The 
first was opened to the public in 1908 and belonged to Santa Casa da Misericórdia. Since 
it was never renovated, it presented a precarious situation and, as a result of the 
community’s efforts, a new facility was built and inaugurated in 2000. This unit operates 
also as a university hospital. By Decree-law No. 288/2002, it was transformed in a Public 
Company. Dated from 1955, Hospital do Fundão pertained also to Santa Casa da 
Misericórdia that managed it until 1981, when it passed to the Portuguese NHS. In 1999, 
both hospitals integrated the Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, and in 2005 the medical 
centre was transformed in a PEEH, by Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December 
(http://www.chcbeira.pt, 2013)11. 
 
                                                 
10
 http://www.chporto.pt  accessed in 14th 2013 
11
 http://www.chcbeira.pt, accessed in 14th 2013 
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Hospital da Figueira da Foz, EPE  
It is a medical facility located in the centre of Portugal, near Coimbra, serving 
approximately 216.000 people. It was established as a Hospital in 1839 by Santa Casa da 
Misericórdia. In 1970 its property was transferred to the State and, in 1979, the hospital 
became a PASH. In 2002, by Decree-law No. 286/2002, 10 December, it was transformed 
into a Public Company and, in 2005, by Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December, it 
became a PEEH (http://www.hdfigueira.min-saude.pt, 2013)12. 
Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE 
Located in the north of Portugal, in Barcelos, this hospital has its roots in the 13th 
century, in a building that was constructed to isolate lepers. In the 19th century, a former 
nunnery was donated to Santa Casa da Misericórdia, in order to reorganize medical 
services and in 1970 a new building was added to modernize the hospital. In the 90’s, was 
built a unit to accommodate administrative services and the hospitals’ pharmacy. It serves 
approximately 100.000 people. It was integrated as a PASH in the Portuguese NHS in 
1979 and, by Decree-law No. 293/2002, 11 December, transformed in a Public Company. 
In 2005, by Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December, it became a PEEH 
(http://www.hbarcelos.min-saude.pt, 2013)13. 
 
Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE (HIDP) 
Located in the city of Aveiro, and edified by Santa Casa da Misericórdia in the first 
decade of the 20th century, this hospital received its first patients in 1914. In 1976, it was 
nationalized and with the creation of the Portuguese NHS, integrated, along with Hospital 
de Águeda, the Aveiro-Sul Hospital Centre. Despite this concentration, the growth of both 
institutions determined their separation in 1987. In 2002, the hospital becomes a Public 
Company and, following Decree-law No. 233/2005, 29 December, it was transformed into 
a PEEH. It serves approximately 385.000 people (http://www.hip.min-saude.pt, 2013)14. 
 
                                                 
12
 http://www.hdfigueira.min-saude.pt, accessed in 14th July 2012. 
13
 http://www.hbarcelos.min-saude.pt, accessed in 14th July 2013. 
14
 http://www.hip.min-saude.pt, accessed in 14th July 2013. 
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Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos  
This healthcare unit was created in 1999 as a PASH. It was the first Local 
healthcare unit created in Portugal and integrates a Hospital (Hospital Pedro Hispano) and 
eight local healthcare units spread through the municipality of Matosinhos. Hospital Pedro 
Hispano was created in 1997 in order to substitute the existing local hospital which had 
become obsolete. In the building of the old hospital are now operating local health centres. 
In 2002, it was transformed in a Public Company and, in 2005, by the Decree-law No. 
233/2005, 29 December, was transformed in a PEEH comprising along with the hospital 
the other local health services facilities. It serves a population of, approximately, 318.000 
people in the north of Portugal (http://www.ulsm.min-saude.pt, 2013).15 
 
5.2. Information Disclosure 
The Entities’ management reports contents were analysed using Table 2, in chapter 
3, above regarding the good governance practices’ disclosure compliance level. The results 
of each hospital were organised in tables by hospital, each containing per year, a yes/no 
compliance column and the way in which the hospital complied. For subsequent years of 
compliance, a column of improvement was added. The results are summarized in the 
Appendixes 1 to 10. 
From the analysis of the tables in the appendixes, it can be easily perceived that 
most of the hospitals were complying with the majority of the items in the MCR No. 
49/2007, 28 March, by 2011. This compliance was not immediate but progressive through 
the years having stabilised in most of the cases in 2008, two years after the Decree-law was 
approved. Next, an analysis of the disclosure of each analysed hospital’s management 
report is provided.  
 
Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE 
The analysis to the level of compliance with MCR No. 49/2007, 28 March, 
regarding Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE, summarized in Appendix 
1, has to be performed with reference to the hospitals that merged into it. Thus, for the 
                                                 
15
 http://www.ulsm.min-saude.pt, accessed in 14th July 2013. 
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period between 2007 and 2010, the analysis was carried upon the financial statements of 
Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra, EPE, Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra, EPE and 
Centro Hospitalar Psiquiátrico de Coimbra. 2007 was the first year in which one of the 
entities became a PEEH, being this Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra, EPE. For this year, the 
level of disclosure was very poor once only items such as mission, objectives, corporate 
bodies’ identification and remunerations, and internal regulations were disclosed. From 
2008 until 2010 (inclusive), the level of disclosure of this hospital was the same, which 
means that the legal measures that have been emanated during the period had none or little 
consequence over the entity’s disclosure practices.  
As for Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra, EPE, since 2008 a PEEH, it had, 
since that year, a Governance chapter within its annual report. In this chapter, the hospital 
follows the items in MCR No. 49/2007, generally complying with the disclosure 
requirements. Nevertheless, the disclosure, although being made, was very general with 
resource to ambiguous paragraphs stating the compliance but without specifying how it 
was achieved. As such, for example, regarding economic, social and environmental 
sustainability, the annual report only produces a very light analysis and does not explain 
objectives or measures tending to the compliance in these fields.  
Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra, EPE is the most complying of the three entities 
comprising CHUC. In fact even though in 2007 its level of compliance was very poor, it 
has, since that year improved progressively its disclosures, reaching in 2010 a full 
compliance with MCR No. 49/2007. This evolution was not felt immediately after 2007, 
since in 2008 there were several items not being complied with, such as goods and services 
acquisition procedures, control of information disclosure and conflict of interests’ 
prevention mechanisms. 
Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE presented its first annual 
report in 2011 and, since there was a merger, it is evident a drawback in the level of 
compliance, mainly because there was little time to prepare an internal regulation, a new 
regulation of acquisition procedures, a new ethics code and a risk control system, which 
would cover the three institutions. 
In this medical centre, in which, due to its size and physical dispersion, it is 
difficult to homogenise procedures and centralize management, it can be concluded that by 
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2011 the level of compliance was high but it was achieved progressively and as a result of 
the merger, since one of the entities Centro Hospitalar Psiquiátrico de Coimbra revealed 
poor compliance levels as late as 2010. 
 
 
 Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE 
In 2006, the annual reports of both Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE and Hospital 
Pulido Valente, EPE revealed a weak disclosure level regarding governance practices as 
can be seen in Appendix 2. In fact, only mission and internal regulation were referred in 
Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE’s annual report and Hospital Pulido Valente, EPE, besides 
its mission, only disclosed management’s identification and remuneration. There was a 
significant improvement in Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE’s level of disclosures in 2007 
(most certainly linked to the MCR No. 49/2007) and a more light effort on Hospital Pulido 
Valente, EPE.  
In 2008, with the creation of Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE there was a 
setback in disclosure levels, since many of the disclosures are generic as for instance the 
disclosure of the evaluation of good governance principles compliance in which the report 
only states that the hospital complies but does not detail how. From that year onwards there 
was a progressive increase in disclosure levels and by 2011 this PEEH complied with 
every disclosure requirement except for risk control system, regarding which only a brief 
description of risk management was performed. Notwithstanding it should be noticed that, 
despite the efforts, some of the disclosures were still on generic terms, namely regarding 
sustainability in which only future objectives were mentioned without stating precise 
measures to be taken in order to achieve those objectives. 
As a conclusion, even though one of the hospitals (Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE) 
was complying with most of the disclosure requirements by 2007, the merger brought 
some turbulence to the disclosure process which was only surmounted in 2011. 
 
Centro Hospitalar de São João, EPE 
Centro Hospitalar de São João, EPE was transformed in a PEEH in 2006 with 
effects in January 2007. As such, in 2006, it had no obligation of presenting accounts in an 
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entrepreneurial form. This can be observed in Appendix 3 in the column regarding that 
year. In 2007, the disclosure of governance related items was limited to Board’s 
identification and remuneration, goods and services’ acquisition procedures and internal 
regulations. From 2008 onwards, the annual reports registered a significant improvement 
regarding disclosure. In 2008, the information was scattered in the management report but 
most of the items in MCR 49/2007 were disclosed, the exceptions being related with 
objectives, economic and social sustainability, ethics code, risk control system, conflict of 
interests’ prevention mechanisms and evaluation on good governance principles 
compliance. 
In 2011, the management report only failed to comply with the items regarding 
economic and social sustainability. Even so, for some of the items, the disclosure regarding 
the evaluation of the levels of compliance was limited to a generic paragraph stating 
compliance without specifying how it was achieved. 
Once again it can be stated that 2008 was the turning point in disclosure practices, 
more than a year after the MCR No. 49/2007. 
 
Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE 
In 2006, only Hospital de Santa Marta was a PEEH. The annual report of this unit 
for that year was very poor regarding governance disclosures, as summarized in Appendix 
4, being limited to mission and management board member’s identification and 
remuneration. 
In 2007, the accounts regarded the four hospitals that were merged into Centro 
Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE and it is noticeable the improvement in governance 
disclosures even though not having addressed all the items in MCR No. 49/2007 (items 
regarding ethics code, risk control system, conflict of interests’ prevention mechanisms, 
evaluation on the compliance with good governance principles and control of information 
disclosure were still not addressed). Nevertheless, the management report puts some 
emphasis in quality accreditation and internal procedures improvement which are 
consonantly disclosed in what seems to be a concern with legitimacy of the management. It 
is necessary to wait for 2009 to notice a real improvement in disclosure. In this year, the 
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only items which were not disclosed regard risk control system and conflict of interests’ 
prevention mechanisms, as well as information disclosure control. In 2011, the annual 
report succeeded in fulfilling all the disclosure obligations.  
By opposition with the previous hospitals, the turning point in governance 
disclosures in Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE only occurred in 2009 (two years 
after the MCR No. 49/2007). And, as stated above, only in 2011 did the entity fully 
disclose every item in the legal provision. The quality of the disclosure in this medical 
facility is significant in most of the items but regarding risk control it presents a ceremonial 
compliance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) in the sense that there was no risk control system 
implemented but only a plan to address fraud and corruption. 
 
 Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
In 2006, the only existing hospital, of the entities that would merge into Centro 
Hospitalar do Porto, EPE, which was a PEEH, was Hospital Geral de Santo António, 
EPE, as can be seen in Appendix 5. Its annual report limited its disclosures on governance 
to mission and board members’ identification. In 2007 Hospital Geral de Santo António, 
EPE presented a management report before the merger which revealed the same 
weaknesses as the 2006 report. But, strangely enough, the management report presented by 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE, as a result of the merger, complied with almost every 
disclosure recommendation in MCR No. 49/2007, failing only in the environmental 
sustainability analysis, ethics code and risk control system, which leads to the hypothesis 
that this medical facility succeeded in disclosing the items that were not resource 
consuming (as implementing a risk control system and a sustainability analysis). Also, 
there was no control of the information disclosed. Nevertheless, some of the disclosures 
were very generic and mentioned work in progress in several areas, such as internal 
regulation and goods and services acquisition. This behaviour seems to point to an 
avoidance strategy, as defined by Oliver (2011). 
Progressively Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE improved its governance disclosure 
and, by 2011, the only item which was not being disclosed regarded risk control system, in 
a similar behaviour with other entities analysed and probably by the same reasons (it is 
more difficult and time consuming to implement a risk control system).  
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In this PEEH is evident the relation between the legal provision, the merger and 
disclosure practices. It appears that Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE’s management took 
advantage of the merger to comply with the legislation in force at the time and, 
consequently, draw a disclosure framework which would only have to be improved 
through the following years. 
 
Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE 
Of all the entities analysed, Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE, in 
Appendix 6, is the one with a more even behaviour throughout the period analysed. In fact, 
this medical centre reveals high levels of disclosure since 2006, when only four items were 
not disclosed: objectives, control of disclosed information, risk control system and conflict 
of interests’ prevention mechanisms. Even though in 2008 and 2009 there have been some 
setbacks, namely regarding evaluation of good governance principles compliance and 
ethics code, by 2011 the hospital only failed to disclose matters related to risk control 
system and ethics code.  
In the annual reports of Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE, there is no 
evidence of a change due to the legal provision once this hospital was already complying 
with the disclosure requirements that became mandatory in 2007, in the annual report of 
2006. 
 
Hospital da Figueira da Foz, EPE 
Hospital da Figueira da Foz, EPE reveals a normal behaviour regarding 
information disclosure as laid out in Appendix 7. As expected, in 2006, its levels of 
disclosure are very poor and respect to board members identification and remuneration, 
while, in 2007, it is extended only to mission statement and objectives as well to internal 
regulations. 
As in other entities above, the major progress was made in 2008. Even if in generic 
paragraphs, there is a concern in following the items in MCR No. 49/2007. The only items 
which were not disclosed regard acquisition procedures (transactions not performed in 
arm’s length and list of suppliers over 5% of total supplies), control of disclosed 
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information, ethics code (though it mentions an ethics commission), risk control system 
and conflict of interests’ prevention mechanisms. 
From 2008 onwards, the items were progressively addressed and, by 2010, all the 
requirements in MCR No. 49/2007 were fully complied with, which might be an indication 
of the desire to fulfil the legal provision. 
 
Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE 
From the analysis of the table in Appendix 8, it can be extracted that governance 
principles’ disclosure in Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE was not even through the 
years, having a considerable setback in 2007 and 2008, when compared to 2006. As such, 
in 2006, the annual report of this PEEH presented a considerable level of disclosures in 
most of the items that would be later required by MCR No. 49/2007. The items not 
disclosed regarded acquisition procedures, namely, list of suppliers representing over 5% 
of total supplies, and transactions not performed within arm’s length, ethics code (though it 
mentions an ethics commission), risk control system and conflict of interests’ prevention 
mechanisms. 
In 2007 and 2008, the annual reports failed to comply with MCR No. 49/2007, 
complying only with the disclosure of mission statement, objectives and board members’ 
identification and remuneration. 
In 2009, there was an obvious effort to disclose all the required items and the only 
flaws regard work in progress (code of ethics and risk system development) and control of 
information disclosed and conflict of interests’ prevention mechanisms. By 2010, all the 
items were fully disclosed. 
It can be stated that Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE had an atypical behaviour 
regarding governance principles disclosure. In fact, of free will it disclosed many items 
when the provision was not yet in force (2006) and failed to do so when it became 
mandatory. 
Only in 2009, and perhaps by force of mimetic isomorphism, and the shareholder’s 
recommendation (the State), did this hospital begin to comply with MCR No. 49/2007.  
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Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE 
Analysing the annual reports of Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE summarized in 
Appendix 9, allows observing that 2008 was the year that triggered the compliance with 
MCR No. 49/2007. In fact, in 2006 and 2007, the annual reports were deficient in 
governance practices’ disclosure which was limited to the mission statement, board 
members identification and remuneration and a reference to the internal regulation in 2006.  
As for 2008, the level of compliance clearly improved when compared with the 
previous years, and the only items which were not being disclosed related to objectives, 
suppliers representing over 5% of supplies, evaluation on the compliance with good 
governance principles, control of information disclosed risk control system and conflict of 
interests’ prevention mechanisms. 
By 2011, the only disclosure obligations that were not being met with were, 
objectives, control of information disclosed and risk control system. 
The analysis allows concluding that the MCR No. 49/2007 was probably the reason 
which led Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE to improve its disclosure practices even if it was 
with a delay of approximately one year and for some of the items in an apparent way. 
 
Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, EPE 
By 2006, in its annual report, the Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, EPE 
limited its disclosures on governance to the mission, board members identification and 
remuneration, general reference to national provisions regarding acquisition procedures 
and to the risk management system manual as shown in Appendix 10. In 2007, there was a 
leap in information disclosure and the annual report only failed to disclose conflict of 
interests’ prevention mechanisms and the code of ethics (which was in progress). 
Even though there have been some setbacks in 2010 regarding the disclosure of 
suppliers representing over 5% of supplies and the control of information, in 2011 the 
entity complied with all the items in MCR No.49/2007, except for the conflict of interests’ 
prevention mechanisms. 
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It is clear, from the above that this medical unit made an effort to comply with the 
legal provision as soon as it was approved in 2007. 
 
5.3. Institutional Pressures and Strategic Responses: Analysis and Discussion 
Throughout the last thirty years the successive Portuguese governments have 
pursued continuous reforms in the NHS issuing several legal provisions. Among these 
legal provisions, some have been addressed to governance practices in an attempt to bring 
the PEEHs to a modernized way of not only doing business but also of disclosing 
accurately and timely the management instruments used in their activity in order to ensure 
transparency. As such, the Portuguese tried to induce good governance practices in PEEHs 
through coercive isomorphism by issuing mandatory legal provisions. This is portrayed in 
MCR No. 49/2007, where, along with disclosure obligations demanded from the PEEs, 
there is also a chapter regarding the State’s role as a shareholder. There has also been an 
update to the public manager regime (by Decree-law No. 8/2012) and a clarification of the 
strategic guidelines for PEEs. By the several legislation produced it is clear that the path 
chosen by the Portuguese government has been one of coerciveness regarding the 
implementation of good governance practices by PEEs. 
Presently, the disclosure obligations imposed upon the PEEHs are established in the 
above mentioned MCR No. 49/2007 and regard the disclosure of mission, objectives and 
general principles of conduit, management board’s identification and remuneration, items 
regarding transactions (internal and external regulations binding the entity, list of important 
suppliers, transactions performed outside market conditions), sustainability analysis 
(economic, environmental and social), evaluation of compliance with good governance 
principles and control of disclosed information, as well as ethics code, risk control system 
and conflict of interests prevention. The disclosure of this items is mandatory but there is 
no penalty for noncompliance because it is instituted the principle of “comply or else”. So, 
the non-complying entities should explain the reasons underlying the noncompliance. 
When performing a time line analysis on the tables, available in Appendixes 1 to 
10, the results point to a gap between the time the MCR No. 49/2007 was issued and its 
implementation in the analysed hospitals. It would be expected that the these hospitals 
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would have low levels of compliance before 2007 and would increase these levels 
throughout the years until reaching full compliance. 
As such, in 2006 most of the entities did not meet the minimum of disclosures 
regarding governance practices. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that Centro 
Hospitalar da Cova da Beira disclosed twelve of the sixteen items in MCR No. 49/2007 
and Hospital de Santa Maria Maior was successful in disclosing ten of the items. This was 
an atypical behaviour that could be explained by an attempt to anticipate the legal 
provision and assume a leading position regarding the disclosure of good practices. It 
should be noted that regarding Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, the fact that it is a 
university hospital with a need to prove itself as a high quality medical services renderer 
may have contributed for the early disclosure. 
Regarding the other hospitals studied, the levels of disclosure were very poor, with 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto disclosing only two of the items (Mission and Board 
member’s remuneration). Is should, however, be highlighted that for this period the MCR 
No. 49/2007 had not been published, so it is laudable that, as seen above, two of the 
entities, from their own initiative, made an effort towards disclosing governance practices. 
This implies that, without any external pressure from the shareholder (the State), they 
disclosed information following the best practices in the private sectors. A possible 
explanation for this can be a mimetic behaviour translated by the fact that the management 
boards of these entities tried to implement in their organizations disclosing practices from 
other organizations even if in a ceremonial way (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
In 2007, there was a general increase of the disclosing items that may be the result 
of a coercive isomorphism arising from the publication of the MCR No. 49/2007. It is clear 
that the State tried to influence the institutional environment by coerciveness, enhancing 
PEEHs’ disclosure through a mandatory instrument. Even though there was an increase in 
disclosing items, some of the disclosures, as in Centro Hospitalar do Porto, are merely 
ceremonial. In fact, regarding sustainability issues disclosure there is a mere description of 
definitions and a statement of concern towards achieving it without really defining the 
targets and measures to be taken in order to achieve economic, social and environmental 
sustainability.  
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Strangely enough was the behaviour of Hospital Santa Maria Maior in which there 
was a setback regarding disclosing items, since it only disclosed four items in the legal 
provision against the ten items it had disclosed in the financial statements regarding 2006. 
A possible explanation for this might be the change in the board that occurred in 2007. 
This corroborates the idea of a ceremonial adoption of the MCR No. 49/2007 requirements 
(Meyers & Rowan, 1977) in 2006, since that if there had been a full abidance to the legal 
provision in 2006, then they would be easily continued to be disclosed in future years. 
These behaviours indicate a pretence acceptance of the legal provision in what can 
be a strategic response of avoidance through concealment tactics, as identified by Oliver 
(2001), by the hospitals in an attempt of showing compliance rather than actually 
complying. 
When analysing the level of disclosure for the year 2008, it may be concluded that 
there was a general improvement, since the majority of the entities disclosed more than 
half of the items required by the legal provision in analysis. The only entity that failed to 
comply with this was once again Hospital Santa Maria Maior, EPE, which continued to 
disclose only four of the sixteen items in MCR No. 49/2007. Once again, regarding some 
of the items, such as internal and external regulations disclosure and evaluation on the 
compliance of good governance practices, there is only a generic paragraph stating 
compliance without any evidence of how this compliance is achieved. This points out to a 
ceremonial compliance instead of a real compliance as a response to an institutional 
pressure regarding disclosure (Meyers &Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 2001). In 2008 the entity 
with a highest level of compliance was Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra, EPE that 
has disclosed thirteen of the sixteen items required by the legal provision. 
Albeit this apparent level of disclosure, when deepening the analysis, it is again 
clear that for some of the items such as sustainability, objectives and level of compliance, 
and internal and external regulations, the information disclosed simply states a compliance 
and not the means by which it is achieved which seems to indicate rather than a full 
adoption of the disclosure requirements, a pretension of adoption in a strategy that seems 
to point to the avoidance strategy laid down by Oliver (2001). 
Advancing to 2009 (and so, two years after the issue of MCR No. 49/2007), it can 
be observed that most of the entities have acceptable levels of disclosure since the hospital 
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with the lowest degree of compliance is Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos EPE, 
complying with nine of the disclosing items while Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
(which presents the highest level of compliance) shows a disclosure of fourteen items. As 
such there was an increase in compliance when compared with the previous year. Here also 
it can be viewed that there is still an apparent compliance regarding some of the items, 
namely regarding policies towards achieving environmental, economic and social 
sustainability.  
In 2010, the highest level of compliance regarding good governance practices 
disclosure was achieved by two entities, Centro Hospitalar Coimbra, EPE and Hospital de 
Santa Maria Maior, EPE both referring the sixteen mandatory disclosing items in their 
annual reports. Nevertheless, there was still some difficulty in fully addressing these items 
since, by the analysis conducted for items such as conflict of interests prevention (CHC) 
and risk control (Centro Hospitalar Coimbra, EPE and Hospital de Santa Maria Maior), 
the disclosure is merely descriptive and not explanatory in what seems to confirm an 
attempt to pretend a compliance. 
Finally for 2011, several entities succeeded in mentioning all the items required by 
the MCR No. 49/2007. These entities were Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE, 
Hospital Distrital da Figueira da Foz, EPE and Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE. The 
entity with the lowest level of compliance was Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de 
Coimbra, EPE, having disclosed only twelve of the items which implied a decrease in 
compliance level when compared with 2010 (this hospital centre resulted from the merger, 
in 2011, of Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra, EPE, Centro Hospitalar Coimbra, 
EPE and Centro Hospitalar e Psiquiátrico de Coimbra and this might be a plausible 
explanation for the decrease in the disclosure compliance levels due to administrative 
reorganization). However, it is still notorious the difficulty in fully complying with 
disclosures in what regards risk control systems. In fact, this item is the weakest regarding 
disclosure level in all of the reports analysed in the study. And even though the entities 
state some intended measures (such as risk prevention plans) none of them described and 
referred a risk control system implementation or risk control procedures in place. 
Also, it should be highlighted that the items that took more time to disclose were 
items related with procedure implementation, such as sustainability analysis and risk 
control system. The reason for this increased delay, when compared with other disclosure 
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requirements, may lay in the fact that while it is comparatively easy to disclose 
management board’s identification and remuneration (among others), it is more difficult 
and resource consuming to implement sustainability practices and risk control systems.  
Finally, the accomplishment of the disclosures was also due to a mimetic effect in 
the sense that hospitals felt obliged to fulfil with the obligations not only as a result of legal 
demand but also by mimicking what other hospitals were doing. In fact, the maps used to 
control the information disclosed are identical in all the hospitals that fulfil with this 
disclosure obligation. 
From the above, it can be concluded that there was a delay in fully addressing the 
MCR No. 49/2007, regarding disclosure obligation of good governance practices. 
Nevertheless, the evolution was similar and parallel between the entities. A tentatively 
explanation for this delay may reside in the process of isomorphism that is liable to occur 
within entities operating in the same activity. When similar players in the market have 
better practices, the entities are tempted to follow them, by mimetic isomorphism.  
When observing the time the entities took to implement the governance disclosure 
requirements it is clear that the MCR No. 49/2007 adoption was not immediate and 
demanded the implementation of governance structures within the PEEHs studied. This is 
supported by the fact that until 2007 none of the entities had a governance chapter in their 
annual reports. As time went by, the hospitals grew aware of the need to address the legal 
disposition and progressively increased their disclosed items even if in a ceremonial 
manner. 
As such the strategy implemented by most of the entities was a strategy of 
avoidance, as defined by Oliver (1991), in the sense that, conscious of the need to fulfil 
with the requirements in the legal provision and therefore comply with external pressures 
imposed by government, the hospitals tried to conceal noncompliance by pretending to 
disclose all the items they were imposed upon.  
The analysis performed on the annual reports of these entities has also tried to 
examine if entities’ size (as determined in Tables 3 and 4 in chapter 3) and board 
characteristics would have any impact on the level of disclosure. From this analysis it is 
possible to conclude that the level of disclosure does not appear to be related with size 
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since the behaviour of the analysed hospitals is similar regardless of their dimension.  
Underlying this is the fact that one of the most complying PEEHs is Centro Hospitalar da 
Cova da Beira, EPE, one of the lowest revenue entities. Concerning the information on the 
characteristics of the boards, this was not available for several hospitals in their annual 
reports (Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE, Centro Hospitalar Universitário de 
Coimbra, EPE, Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE), and as such it has conditioned 
further conclusions.  
By referring the items in their annual reports, PEEHs analysed have tried to induce 
the thought that they were fully addressing the disclosing obligations when in fact, in 
several cases (as shown above), they were merely pretending compliance. This seems to 
confirm that they engaged in a ceremonial of acceptance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and not 
in a full abidance of the disclosure requirements. 
These obstacles may help to understand why the hospitals apparently chose a 
response of avoidance in a strategy of pretence compliance. 
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6. Conclusions 
This final chapter presents an overview of the major findings in the study and the 
answers to the research questions laid out in the first chapter. It also encompasses the 
contributions and limitations of the research conducted and points out possible directions 
for future research in this field. 
 
6.1. Major Findings 
The main objective of this research was to analyse in which way State regulations 
on good governance in Portugal have determined PEEHs’ behaviour namely regarding 
information disclosure. As such, it aimed at answering the following question: How did 
Portuguese legislation efforts on good governance principles influence the information 
disclosure in PEEHs?  
Due to the complexity of this departure question, it was divided in the following 
three sub questions:  
• What is the legal framework of good governance principles applicable to external 
reporting in PEEHs? 
• Which are the consequences of this legal framework in the external reporting of the 
PEEHs? 
• In which way did the PEEHs institutionalize this legal framework in their financial 
reporting mechanisms? 
Regarding the first sub question, in chapter four above was presented the sequence of 
legal provisions issued by successive governments and parliaments regarding SOEs and 
Portuguese NHS. From the collection of legal provisions regarding PEEs and PEEHs, it is 
possible to conclude that throughout the years there has been a growing awareness of the 
importance of good governance principles and their disclosure. There was a concern to 
legitimate management boards by forcing them to adopt certain behaviours of 
independence and prevention of conflict of interests (namely regarding expenses). 
It is relevant to refer that due to the difficulty to enforce these laws, parliament has 
felt the need to produce recommendations to government in order to implement 
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mechanisms of enforcement as stated by Parliament’s Resolution No. 53/2011, 18 
February, and implement the “comply or explain” principle regarding good governance 
principles. Nevertheless, this may pose a problem for correct disclosure. By implementing 
the “comply or explain” principle, government is allowing noncompliance as long as 
entities present a justification for not complying. While no penalty is established, the 
PEEHs will continue either to apparently disclose information or simply fail to do so, 
covered by explanations they deem justifiable. 
Addressing the second sub question, in chapter five was conducted an analysis on 
ten PEEHs annual reports’ for a six year period beginning in 2006 (before MCR No. 
49/2007 was issued) and ending in 2011 (at the time of this analysis the annual reports 
regarding 2012 were not available).  This analysis aimed at determining the level of 
compliance with the disclosures demanded by MCR No. 49/2007). From this analysis, it is 
clear that the compliance with the legal provision was neither immediate nor uniform 
among the PEEHs studied.  
Also, regarding the third sub question, the research allowed to conclude that despite 
the government’s determination in obtaining good governance principles’ disclosure from 
PEEHs through coercive pressures (legal provisions), many of the entities analysed merely 
adopted a response strategy of avoidance as defined by Oliver (2001), in the sense that 
through concealment tactics pretended to comply, transmitting an image of acceptance, 
when in fact this pretence acceptance lies in merely stating a compliance instead of a full 
disclosure. 
In fact, the corporatization and the contracting, the adoption of good governance 
practices and the adoption of reporting practices to stakeholders were the levers for 
promoting hospital governance and the principles of good governance in public hospitals 
(OPSS, 2008; Raposo, 2007). 
As a result of this study, it can be concluded that, in Portugal, the adoption of good 
governance practices was leveraged by legal provisions that made mandatory the 
disclosure of good governance principles. Nevertheless, the disclosure practices were not 
neither immediate nor complete and their accomplishment was also due to a mimetic effect 
in the sense that hospitals felt obliged to fulfil with the obligations not only as a result of 
legal demand but also by mimicking what other hospitals were doing.  
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6.2. Contributions 
In this research was performed a time line description on the evolution of 
legislation and normative production from the Portuguese successive governments and 
parliament regarding Public governance principles and their disclosure. This description 
helps understanding the consecutive efforts in endowing PEEHs with modern management 
and reporting structures. 
This study is also important for the accounting regulation entities to better 
understand disclosure explaining factors of the PEEHs and, therefore, contemplate these 
factors in future legislation and recommendations. The findings will contribute to increase 
the knowledge on disclosure existing practices in PEEHs and the necessity to harmonise 
and improve them.  
The study also has contributed to the increase in hospital governance literature. 
 
 
6.3. Limitations 
The limitations of the study are related to the availability of information. In fact, it 
was not possible to extend this study to 2012 due to the fact that the PEEHs’ annual reports 
for this period were not available in time for their inclusion. Also, regarding the years 
before 2006, most of the hospitals were PASHs and, therefore, were not obliged to present 
annual reports in an integrated format. 
Finally, the theoretical framework is a rich one and could have been more deeply 
applied. However, restrictions of time and the amount of data involved complicated the 
process. Additionally, the adoption of this theoretical framework does not imply that it is 
the only one possible or the better one. Other frameworks could be applied, like Agency 
Theory and Stakeholders Theory. Notwithstanding, it was considered that the one adopted 
is best suited to the objective and research questions that guided this research.   
6.4. Future Research 
Future research in this field can deepen into management board composition and 
supervisory bodies’ rotation in PEEHs as well as the existence or not of an audit committee 
or a governance committee. Also, a study could be conducted based upon interviews to 
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board members aiming at understanding the factors that determine the institutionalization 
of good governance practices’ compliance and their disclosure. 
Additionally, it would be important to study the outcomes of the technical group 
created by Ordinance No. 10823/2010, 1 July, with the incumbency of proposing a new 
organizational structure for the Portuguese NHS’s hospitals including the PEEHs. The 
proposals of this technical group should enlighten future measures regarding the 
Portuguese NHS. 
Furthermore, this study opens the veil to future research on the limitations of the 
“comply or explain” principle in public governance in the sense that if entities are no 
compelled to comply without any penalties, they will resist to implement the best 
governance principles. 
After the conclusion of this study, the Portuguese government issued Decree-law 
No. 133/2013, 3 October, revoking Decree-law 558/99, 17 December, updated by Decree-
law No.300/2007, 23 August, regarding SOEs. As such, future research can be directed 
towards the changes implemented by this Decree-law, namely in what concerns the State’s 
role as shareholder. 
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Legislation 
Decreto-Lei N.º 11/93 de 15 de janeiro, Diário da República, Série I - A – N.º 12 – 15 de 
janeiro de 1993 
Decreto-Lei N.º 133/2013 de3 de outubro Diário da República, Série I — N.º 191 — 3 de 
outubro de 2013 
Decreto-Lei N.º 233/2005 de 29 de dezembro, Diário da República — Série I -A – N.º 249 
— 29 de dezembro de 2005   
Decreto-Lei N.º 300/2007 de 23 de agosto Diário da República, Série I — N.º 162 — 23 de 
agosto de 2007 
Decreto-Lei N.º 464/82 de 9 de dezembro, Diário da República, Série I – N.º 283 – 9 de 
dezembro de 1982 
Decreto-lei N.º 558/99 de 17 de dezembro, Diário da República, Série I - A –N.º 292- 17 
de dezembro de 2012 
Decreto-Lei N.º 71/2007 de 27 de março, Diário da República, Série I—N.º 61—27 de 
março de 2007 
Decreto-Lei N.º 8/2012 de 18 de janeiro, Diário da República, Série I — N.º 13 — 18 de 
janeiro de 2012  
Despacho N.º 3596/2008, de 16 de janeiro, do Ministério da Saúde, Diário da República, 
Série II – N.º 31 – 13 de fevereiro 2008.  
Despacho N.º 10823/2010 de 1 de julho, Diário da República, Série II — N.º 126 — 1 de 
julho de 2010  
Lei N.º 27/2002 de 8 de novembro, Diário da República — Série I - A N.º 258 — 8 de 
novembro de 2002 
Lei N.º 40/90 de 24 de agosto de 1990, Diário da República, Série I – N.º184 – 10 de 
agosto de 1990 
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Resolução da Assembleia da República N.º 53/2011 de 18 de fevereiro Diário da 
República, Série I – N.º 57 – 22 de março de 2011. 
Resolução do Conselho de Ministros N.º 135/2002, de 20 de novembro, Diário da 
República, Série I-B – N.º268 - 20 de novembro de 2002. 
Resolução do Conselho de Ministros N.º 49/2007, de 28 de março, Diário da República, 
Série I-B – N.º 62 – 28 de março 2008. 
Resolução do Conselho de Ministros N.º 70/2008 de 17 de abril, Diário da República, Série 
I – N.º 79 – 22 de abril de 2008. 
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Appendix 1 – Centro Hospitalar e Universitário de Coimbra, EPE  
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Appendix 2 – Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE 
MCR No. 
49/2007 
Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 CHLN* 2007 HSM 2007 HPV 2006 HSM 2006 HPV 
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** In March 1st, 2008 Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE and Hospital Pulido Valente, EPE merged into Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Norte, EPE 
Legend: 
CHLN – Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte, EPE 
HSM – Hospital de Santa Maria, EPE 
HPV – Hospital Pulido Valente, EPE  
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Appendix 3 – Centro Hospitalar de S. João, EPE 
 
MCR No. 49/2007 
Centro Hospitalar de S João, EPE 
2011** 2010 2009 2008 2007* 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the way in which it is complied with   X 
In the annual Report  and  
paragraph 8.2 of the 
management report  
    
In the annual Report  
and  paragraph 9.2 of 
the management 
report  
  X In the annual report   X In the annual report   X In the annual report 
Objectives and level of compliance    X In paragraph 8.3 of the 
management report   X 
Mere indication of 
compliance with cost 
reduction objectives  
  X 
Mere indication of 
compliance with cost 
reduction objectives  
X   -  X   -  
Management Board members’ identification   X In the annual report     In the management 
report   X In the annual report   X In the annual report   X In the annual report 
Management Board members’ remuneration    X Paragraph 8.2 of the 
management report      
In the management 
report   X In the annual report     In the annual report   X In the annual report 
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  X 
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Several internal 
regulations by 
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Disclosure in the 
management report  in the 
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purchasing internal 
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Disclosure in the 
management report  
in the annual report 
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purchasing internal 
regulation 
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Disclosure in the 
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referring the purchasing 
internal regulation 
  X -   X 
Reference to the 
acquisitions' 
regulation 
Transactions not performed in arm’s length    X Related parties transactions disclosed    X 
Detail of transactions 
with related parties   X 
Detail of transactions 
with related parties   X N/A   X 
Lists the related 
parties 
List of suppliers representing over 5% of total 
supplies    X In the management report   X 3 entities listed   X 3 entities listed   X 3 entities listed   X 3 entities listed 
Economic sustainability analysis  X   -  X    - X   -  X     X   -  
Social sustainability analysis  X   -  X    - X   -    X In a separate chapter 
of the annual report X    - 
Environmental sustainability analysis    X 
In a separate chapter of 
the annual report with 
reference to a 
environmental good 
practices manual  
  X In a separate chapter 
of the annual report   X 
In a separate chapter of 
the annual report   X 
In a separate chapter 
of the annual report X    - 
Evaluation on the compliance of  good governance 
principles    X -   X -   X 
Merely states 
compliance X    - X    - 
Control of disclosed information    X Listed in the management 
report in the annual report X   -  X   -  X    - X    - 
Ethics Code    X Available in the institutional site   X 
Approval of the code 
of ethics   X 
Regulation of the audit 
committee X   
Merely describes a 
regulation regarding 
health rendering 
services and clinical 
tests 
X    - 
Risk control system    X 
Referred to in the 
management report and 
risk prevention plan  
  X 
Referred to in the 
management report 
and risk prevention 
plan  
X   
Merely refers the 
designation of an 
internal auditor 
X    - X    - 
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Conflict of interests prevention mechanisms    X 
Signed statements by the 
board deposited in the  
district attorney's office 
  X 
Signed statements by 
the board deposited 
in the  district 
attorney's office 
  X 
Signed statements by 
the board deposited in 
the  district attorney's 
office 
X   -  X    - 
 
 
*Prior to 2007 Hospital de S. João was a PASH and did not have an annual report 
**includes Hospital Distrital de Valongo 
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Appendix 4 – Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Central, EPE 
MCR No. 
49/2007 
Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 - CHLC 2006*Hospital de Santa Marta 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement N
o 
Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the 
way in which it 
is complied 
with 
  X -   X -   X -   X 
In a separate 
chapter and in a 
subchapter of the 
governance 
chapter 
  X 
In a separate 
chapter of the 
management's 
report 
  X In the management report 
Objectives and 
level of 
compliance  
  X -   X -   X -   X -   X Lists objectives   X Compares budget against real 
and analyses differences 
Management 
Board 
members’ 
identification 
  X -   X With Curricula   X -   X -   X 
In the 
management's 
report 
  X Disclosed in the Notes to the financial statements 
Management 
Board 
members’ 
remuneration  
  X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X Disclosed in the Notes to the financial statements 
Internal and 
External 
regulations  
  X -   X -   X 
Besides Internal 
regime and 
several internal 
regulations, 
mentions 
National legal 
provisions 
  X 
Internal regime 
approved by the 
Health Ministry 
  X 
Internal regime 
awaiting approval 
by the Health 
Ministry. Quality 
accreditation 
X   - 
Acquisition of 
goods and 
services 
procedures  
  X -   X 
Description of 
procedures 
adopted and 
reference to 
recruitment 
internal 
regulation 
  X Generic Paragraph X   - X   - X   - 
Transactions not 
performed in 
arm’s length  
  X N/A   X N/A   X N/A   X N/A 
 
X N/A X   - 
List of suppliers 
representing 
over 5% of total 
supplies  
  X 10 entities disclosed   X 
9 entities 
disclosed   X 
5 entities 
disclosed X   -    X 8 entities listed X   - 
Economic 
sustainability 
analysis  
  X -   X -   X 
Enumerates 
objectives, 
compliance level 
and policies 
  X -   X 
Mentions 
objectives and 
measures 
X   - 
Social 
sustainability 
analysis  
  X -   X -   X 
Enumerates 
objectives, 
compliance level 
and policies 
  X -   X 
Mentions 
objectives and 
measures 
X   - 
Environmental 
sustainability 
analysis  
  X -   X -   X 
Enumerates 
objectives, 
compliance level 
  X -   X 
Mentions 
objectives and 
measures 
X   - 
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and policies 
Evaluation on 
the compliance 
of  good 
governance 
principles  
  X -   X 
Table with 
indicators and 
corresponding 
level of 
compliance 
  X 
Generic 
Paragraph stating 
the efforts 
towards 
compliance 
X   - X   - X   - 
Control of 
disclosed 
information  
  X -   X 
Table with 
disclosed 
information and 
indication of 
where it is 
disclosed 
X   - X   - X   - X   - 
Ethics Code    X 
Indication of 
the link to the 
site where the 
information can 
be consulted 
  X -   X 
Approved and 
available in the 
institutional site 
X   - X   - X   - 
Risk control 
system    X 
Corruption risks 
prevention plan   X 
Lists areas of 
action X   - X   - X   - X   - 
Conflict of 
interests 
prevention 
mechanisms  
  X 
Listing of 
existing 
mechanisms to 
assure board 
independence 
X   - X   - X   - X   - X   - 
 
*Hospital de Santa Marta, EPE was merged in 2007 with Hospital S. José, Hospital S. António dos Capuchos and Hospital D. Estefânia that were previously PASH 
Legend: 
CHLC - Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, EPE 
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Appendix 5 – Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
MCR No. 
49/2007 
Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 CHP* 2007 HGSA** 2006 HGSA 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How No Yes How 
Mission and 
the way in 
which it is 
complied with 
  X -   X 
In a separate 
chapter of the 
Management's 
report 
  X 
In a separate 
chapter of the 
Management's 
report 
  X -   X 
In a separate 
chapter of the 
Management's 
report 
  X 
In the 
Management 
report 
  X 
In the 
Management 
report 
Objectives and 
level of 
compliance  
  X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
Governance 
chapter 
  X -   X -   X 
In the 
Management 
report in a 
chapter of 
governance 
  X Merely descriptive X   -  
Management 
Board 
members’ 
identification 
  X -   X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
governance 
chapter 
  X -   X 
In the 
Management 
report in a 
chapter of 
governance 
  X 
In the 
Management 
report 
  X 
In the 
Management 
report 
Management 
Board 
members’ 
remuneration  
  X -   X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
governance 
chapter 
  X -   X 
In the 
Management 
report in a 
chapter of 
governance 
X   - X   - 
Internal and 
External 
regulations  
  X -   X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
governance 
chapter: 
Internal regime 
Quality 
accreditation 
policies manual 
Administrative 
and accounting 
procedures 
  X 
Internal 
Regulation 
approved 
Several 
department 
regulations 
awaiting 
conclusion 
  X 
Internal 
regulation 
awaiting 
approval and 
department 
regulations 
being prepared 
X   - X   - 
Acquisition of 
goods and 
services 
procedures  
  X -   X -   X 
Goods and 
services 
Purchasing 
regulation 
  X 
Acquisition 
regulation 
approved 
  X Procedures are being adapted X   - X   - 
Transactions 
not performed 
in arm’s length  
  X N/A   X N/A   X N/A   X N/A   X N/A X   - X   - 
List of 
suppliers 
representing 
over 5% of 
total supplies  
  X -   X 3 entities listed   X 4 entities listed   X 4 entities listed   X Did not exist X   - X   - 
Economic 
sustainability 
analysis  
  X -   X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
governance 
chapter 
  X 
In the 
governance 
chapter of the 
Management 
Report 
  X Merely descriptive X   - X   - 
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Social 
sustainability 
analysis  
  X -   X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
governance 
chapter 
  X 
In the 
governance 
chapter of the 
Management 
Report 
  X Merely descriptive X   - X   - 
Environmental 
sustainability 
analysis  
  X -   X -   X 
In a subchapter 
of the 
governance 
chapter 
X   - X    - X   - X   - 
Evaluation on 
the compliance 
of  good 
governance 
principles  
  X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In the 
governance 
chapter of the 
Management 
Report 
X   - X   - 
Control of 
disclosed 
information  
  X -   X 
Listed in 
Management 
report and in 
governance 
chapter 
X   -  X   - X   -  X   - X   - 
Ethics Code    X -   X -   X 
Exists and can 
be accessed at 
www.chporto.pt  
X   - X   - X   - X   - 
Risk control 
system  X   - X   
Only mentions 
internal control 
system - 
reference to the 
procedures of 
accounting and 
administrative 
control 
procedures. 
X   - X   - X   - X   - X   - 
Conflict of 
interests 
prevention 
mechanisms  
  X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
Signed 
statement by 
the board 
declaring 
inexistence of 
conflict of 
interests 
X    - X   -  
 
 
 
 
*After October, 1st 2007 Hospital Geral de Santo António EPE was merged with Maternidade Júlio Dinis and Hospital de Maria Pia and became Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
** Until September 30th 2007 the only PEEH was Hospital Geral de Santo António, EPE 
Legend: 
CHP – Centro Hospitalar do Porto, EPE 
HGSA – Hospital geral de Santo António, EPE  
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Appendix 6 – Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE 
 
MCR No. 49/2007 
Centro Hospitalar da Cova da Beira, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the way in which it is complied 
with   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In the 
governance 
chapter in the 
annual report 
  X 
In a separate 
chapter in the 
annual report 
Objectives and level of compliance    X -   X 
Discloses objectives 
in quality 
accreditation 
  X -   X -   X 
Lists objectives 
and policies to 
achieve them 
X   - 
Management Board members’ identification   X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a separate 
chapter in the 
annual report 
Management Board members’ remuneration    X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a separate 
chapter in the 
annual report 
Internal and External regulations    X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
Reference to 
the internal 
regulation and 
department 
regulations 
Acquisition of goods and services procedures    X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
Mentions 
several legal 
provisions 
Transactions not performed in arm’s length    X -   X N/A   X N/A   X N/A 
 
X N/A   X N/A 
List of suppliers representing over 5% of 
total supplies    X 2 entities listed   X 1 entity listed   X 2 entities listed   X 3 entities listed   X 3 entities listed   X 2 entities listed 
Economic sustainability analysis    X -   X -   X 
Indicates the 
control of the 
economic 
activity 
  X -   X -   X Generic paragraphs 
Social sustainability analysis    X 
Disclosure of policies 
to help the elderly 
patient 
  X -   X -   X -   X -   X Generic paragraphs 
Environmental sustainability analysis    X Energetic efficiency policies   X Waste management   X 
Refers 
environmental 
projects such as 
solar panels 
  X -   X -   X Generic paragraphs 
Evaluation on the compliance of  good 
governance principles    X -   X 
Merely states 
compliance X   - X   -   X -   X 
Merely states 
compliance 
Control of disclosed information    X -   X 
In a governance 
chapter in the annual 
report 
X   - X   - X   - X   - 
Ethics Code  X   - X   Merely mentions the 
ethics committee X   - X   -   X -   X 
Mention to the 
ethics code 
Risk control system  X   - X   Corruption Risks prevention plan X   - X   - X   - X   - 
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Conflict of interests prevention mechanisms    X -   X 
Lists transactions that 
may cause conflict of 
interests 
X   - X   - X   - X   - 
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Appendix 7 – Hospital Distrital da Figueira da Foz, EPE 
MCR No. 49/2007 
Hospital Distrital da Figueira da Foz, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the way in which it is complied 
with   X -   X -   X -   X 
In the 
governance 
chapter in the 
annual report 
  X 
In a separate 
chapter in the 
annual report 
X   -  
Objectives and level of compliance    X -   X -   X -   X -   X Lists 
objectives   X 
Defines 
objectives for 
the following 
year 
Management Board members’ identification   X -   X -   X -   X 
In the 
governance 
chapter in the 
annual report 
  X -   X In the annual 
report 
Management Board members’ remuneration    X -   X -   X -   X 
In the 
governance 
chapter in the 
annual report 
  X 
In a separate 
chapter in the 
annual report 
X    - 
Internal and External regulations    X 
Several regulations 
added to the existing 
ones 
  X -   X -   X -   X 
Refers the 
internal 
regulation and 
other legal 
provisions 
X    - 
Acquisition of goods and services 
procedures    X -   X -   X -   X 
Paragraph 
referring legal 
provisions 
applicable 
X   - X   - 
Transactions not performed in arm’s length    X -   X -   X N/A X    - X   - X   - 
List of suppliers representing over 5% of 
total supplies    X -   X -   X N/A X    - X   - X   - 
Economic sustainability analysis    X -   X -   X 
For objectives 
indicated in past 
years indicates 
level of 
compliance 
  X 
Defines 
objectives and 
measures to be 
taken 
X   - X   - 
Social sustainability analysis    X -   X -   X 
For objectives 
indicated in past 
years indicates 
level of 
compliance 
  X 
Defines 
objectives and 
measures to be 
taken 
X   - X   - 
Environmental sustainability analysis    X -   X -   X 
Defines objectives 
regarding 
improvement in 
waste management 
  X Generic paragraph only X   - X   - 
Evaluation on the compliance of  good 
governance principles  
 
  X -   X -   X -   X Merely states 
compliance X   - X   - 
Control of disclosed information    X -   X Control of information disclosed in a table X   -  X   -  X   - X   - 
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indicating the place of 
disclosure 
Ethics Code    X 
Ethics code approved 
and available in the 
institutional site 
X   - X   - X   Ethics Commission X   - X   - 
Risk control system    X 
Lists several risks and 
refers the 
implementation of an 
internal control system 
  X Corruption risks prevention plan approved   X 
Indicates some 
risks and the 
intention to create 
a risk system 
X   - X   - X   - 
Conflict of interests prevention mechanisms    X -   X 
Paragraph stating that 
board members do not 
intervene in decisions 
where there may exist 
conflict of interests 
X    - X   - X   - X   - 
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Appendix 8 – Hospital de Santa Maria Maior, EPE 
MCR No. 49/2007 
Hospital de Santa maria Maior, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the way in which it is 
complied with   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  
  X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  
  X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in 
the annual report  
Objectives and level of compliance    X -   X In a separate chapter in the annual report X    -   X 
In a separate 
chapter in the 
annual report 
X   -    X 
In a table in the 
annual report in 
a chapter of 
economic 
activity  
Management Board members’ 
identification   X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
Listed in the 
annual report 
Management Board members’ 
remuneration    X -   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In ordinance No. 
351/2006,  31 
march and in a 
table in the 
annual report 
Internal and External regulations    X -   X -   X 
Internal regulation 
approved as well as 
several other generic 
regulations 
X   -   X -   X 
Internal 
regulation 
approved 
Acquisition of goods and services 
procedures    X -   X -     
Purchasing and 
subcontracting 
regulations 
X   - X   -   X 
Linked to the 
internal 
regulation 
Transactions not performed in arm’s 
length    X -   X -   X N/A X   - X   - X   -  
List of suppliers representing over 5% of 
total supplies    X -   X -   X N/A X   - X   - X    - 
Economic sustainability analysis    X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
detailing by 
sustainability type  
  X -   X 
Merely focus the 
economic and 
financial chapters of 
the annual report 
X   - X   -   X 
Merely focus the 
economic and 
financial 
chapters of the 
annual report 
Social sustainability analysis    X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
detailing by 
sustainability type  
  X -   X 
HR policies, social 
policies referring 
problems with 
Alcoholism  
X   - X   -   X 
HR policies, 
social policies 
referring 
problems with 
Alcoholism  
Environmental sustainability analysis    X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
detailing by 
sustainability type  
  X -   X 
Waste management 
policies, gas 
emission reduction, 
substitution of 
propane gas for 
natural gas  
X   - X   -    X 
Waste 
management and 
gas emission 
reduction 
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Evaluation on the compliance of  good 
governance principles    X -   X 
Lists the items in 
the MCR No. 
49/2007 and the 
way in which they 
are complied with 
  X Merely states 
compliance x   - X   -   X 
Merely 
descriptive 
Control of disclosed information    X -   X 
Control of 
information 
disclosed in a table 
indicating the place 
of disclosure in the 
institutional site 
X   -  X   - X   - X   -  
Ethics Code    X Disclosed in the institutional site   X Not available  X   Not concluded X   - X   - X   
Ethics 
commission 
creation 
Risk control system    X Mere reference to the 
corruption risks plan   X 
Corruption risks 
plan in preparation 
and other 
regulations 
X   
Merely states that an 
evaluation of risks 
has been performed 
X   - X   - X   - 
Conflict of interests prevention 
mechanisms    X -   X 
Communication to 
the tax authorities of 
the members of the 
board income 
statements 
X    - X   - X   - X   - 
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Appendix 9 – Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE 
 
MCR No. 49/2007 
Hospital Infante D. Pedro, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the way in which it is complied with   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  
  X -   X In the annual 
report 
Objectives and level of compliance  X   -   X -   X Defines strategic 
objectives X   -     -    X 
Comparison 
between 
budget and 
real 
Management Board members’ identification   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  
  X -   X In the annual 
report 
Management Board members’ remuneration    X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  
  X In the annual 
report   X 
In the annex to 
the financial 
statements 
Internal and External regulations    X -   X 
Several internal 
regulations 
regarding 
accounting, 
purchase 
management, 
fixed assets in 
preparation 
  X -   X 
Internal regulation 
and reference to 
other legal 
provisions in force 
X    -   X 
Internal 
regulation in 
preparation 
Acquisition of goods and services procedures    X -   X -   X -   X 
Internal regulation  
and purchasing 
procedures  
X    - X    - 
Transactions not performed in arm’s length    X -   X -   X -   X N/A X   -  X    - 
List of suppliers representing over 5% of total 
supplies    X 2 entities listed   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  
X    - X     X   - X   - 
Economic sustainability analysis    X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
Efficiency increase 
and higher 
budgetary control 
X   - X   - 
Social sustainability analysis    X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  - 
promoting equity 
and cooperation 
with several 
institutions  
X   - X   - 
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Environmental sustainability analysis    X Lists policies in this 
area 
  X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report  - 
Hospital waste 
management  
X   - X   - 
Evaluation on the compliance of  good 
governance principles    X 
Merely states an 
intention to comply X   -  X   - X   
Merely states the 
intention of 
complying 
X   - X   - 
Control of disclosed information  X   - X    - X   -  X     X   - X   - 
Ethics Code    X -   X 
Ethics code 
approved and 
disclosed 
  X -   X Ethics code in preparation X   - X   - 
Risk control system  X   - X    - X    - X     x   - x   - 
Conflict of interests prevention mechanisms    X -   X 
Discloses policies 
implemented to 
prevent conflict of 
interests  
x    - X    - X   - X   - 
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Appendix 10 – Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, EPE 
MCR No. 49/2007 
Unidade Local de Saúde de Matosinhos, EPE 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes Improvement No Yes How 
Mission and the way in which it is complied with   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
  X 
In the 
management 
report 
Objectives and level of compliance    X -   X 
Compares 
financial with 
budget 
  X -   X -   X 
Compares budget 
with financial 
statements 
X    - 
Management Board members’ identification   X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
  X 
In the notes to 
financial 
statements 
Management Board members’ remuneration    X -   X -   X -   X -   X 
In a chapter of 
governance in the 
annual report 
X    - 
Internal and External regulations    X -   X Internal regulation 
approved   X -   X 
Internal 
regulation 
update 
  X 
Internal 
regulation and 
several other 
legal provisions 
  X 
Only lists the 
relevant national 
legislation 
Acquisition of goods and services procedures    X -   X Purchase 
regulation   X -   X -   X 
Mere descriptive 
referring internal 
regulation 
X   - 
Transactions not performed in arm’s length    X N/A   X N/A X   -  X    - 
 
X Disclosure of 
related parties X   - 
List of suppliers representing over 5% of total 
supplies    X 4 entities listed X       X -   X -   X 6 entities listed X   - 
Economic sustainability analysis    X -   X 
Detail and 
evaluation of 
policies in a 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report and 
evaluation  
X    -   X -   X 
Detail and 
evaluation of 
policies in a 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report and 
evaluation  
X   - 
Social sustainability analysis    X -   X 
Detail and 
evaluation of 
policies in a 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report and 
evaluation  
X    -   X -   X 
Detail and 
evaluation of 
policies in a 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report and 
evaluation  
X   - 
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Environmental sustainability analysis    X -   X 
Detail and 
evaluation of 
policies in a 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report and 
evaluation  
X   -    X -   X 
Detail and 
evaluation of 
policies in a 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report and 
evaluation  
X   - 
Evaluation on the compliance of  good 
governance principles    X -   X 
Lists good 
governance 
principles and the 
way in which they 
are met 
X    -   X -   X 
Mere description 
stating 
compliance 
X   - 
Control of disclosed information    X 
Control of 
information 
disclosed in a 
table indicating 
the place of 
disclosure 
X   -  X    - X       X 
Merely 
descriptive in the 
governance 
chapter of the 
annual report 
X   - 
Ethics Code    X -   X -   X 
Code of ethics 
approved and 
disclosed in the 
institutional site 
X   - X   Code of ethics in preparation X   - 
Risk control system    X -   X 
In the governance 
chapter of the 
annual report 
listing prevention 
mechanisms 
X   -    X -   X 
Existence of 
internal auditor 
Mere description 
in the annual 
report 
  X 
Makes a 
reference to the 
Risk 
management 
system Manual. 
Conflict of interests prevention mechanisms  
 
X   -    X -   X - X   -     -  X    - 
 
